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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: An Application of Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System to Identify Organizational Factors in Maritime Accidents. 
Degree:                      MSc 
In maritime history, the shipping maintains a fairly good safety record generally, but 
still with a number of major maritime accidents occasionally. Maritime accident 
investigation as the main means to improve the maritime safety is widely used in 
maritime practice. The need of a well–structured and –classified accident causation 
model for directing maritime accident investigation is dictated by growing social 
pressure for the further improvement on the safety record of shipping and the major 
reform of understanding of human error, a focus on the organizational factors.  
The purpose of this paper is to adapt a proper accident causation model with 
reference to identification of organizational factors in maritime accidents. In 
connection with the organizational factors in the ISM Code, the desired causation 
model is adapted on the basis of the renowned Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS). By applying the targeted model into two specific 
maritime cases, observations are made as follows: it is positive to apply the adapted 
model in specific maritime cases in terms of directing the collection of accident data 
and sufficient and reliable analysis of the accident. The same principle of the adapted 
HFACS framework can be also applied by the shipping industry for the purpose of 
reviewing and benchmarking shipping safety performance. The significance of 
organizational factors in safety performance is discussed as well. In the end, proper 
recommendations in relation to how to apply such an adapted framework in maritime 
practice based on the remarks above are made. 
KEYWORDS: Organizational Factors, Causation Model, Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS), the International Safety Management Code. 
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
It is widely acknowledged that the shipping industry carries 90% of the globe trade. 
In particular since the 1970’s, the amount of goods actually carried by ships has 
increased dramatically and reaching 8.02 billion tons of goods loaded in 2007 (IMO, 
2009). Strong demand for maritime transport services fuelled by growth in the 
world’s economy and international merchandise trade is still continuing.  
Thanks to the constant endeavours of the rapid development of technology in ship 
design and navigation aids, the shipping industry still maintains a fairly good safety 
record, nevertheless, there are a number of challenges for maritime safety (See 
Figure 1) (Hetherington, Flin & Mearns, 2006). Major maritime disasters 
occasionally take place around the world, such as the Titanic disaster in 1912, the 
TORREY CANYON in 1967 and the ESTONIA in 1994. Perrow (1999) refers to these 
events as “the normal accidents” with the view that multiple and unexpected 
interactions of failures are inevitable. The enormous loss of life and property, as well 
as the environmental damage, involved in shipping casualties, demonstrated the need 
of constant improvement in maritime safety.  
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 Figure 1 Serious and total loss from 1994 to 2009 by number (Ships over 500 GT) 
Source: International Union of Marine Insurance, 2010. 
There are numerous diverse approaches to be applied to improve safety performance 
on board. Accident investigations, as required by the Casualty Investigation Code 
(IMO, 2008a) and implemented by the majority of states (such as the United 
Kingdom by the Merchant Shipping Act 1995), is one of several widely utilized 
approaches to achieve safety (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004). According to 
Harms-Ringdahl’s argument, accident investigation is the “collection and 
examination of facts related to an occurred specific event”. By this definition, we 
clearly see the purpose of accident investigation is to diagnose what occurs in the 
system. Even more meaningfully and pragmatically is that the lessons learned from 
accident investigation should be conducive to prevention of reoccurrence, as stated in 
the Casualty Investigation Code (IMO, 2008a). Along with this useful and positive 
function, most major improvements or modifications to a maritime legislative system, 
criticized as the “disaster-driven system”, are often carried out after lessons learned 
from major accidents (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009). In addition, from the risk assessment 
point of view, the analysis of an accident plays an indispensable role for setting 
priorities and identifying hazardous sources (Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 
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2000). Albeit its passive pattern, the lessons learned from accident investigation 
contribute a lot to the safety record of the maritime industry. However, most of the 
current maritime accident investigation systems encourage investigators to determine 
what happened during an event and how the event occurred, rather than question why 
the event occurred (ABS Consuliting, 2005). This negative aspect of the current 
system discourages investigators to search for underlying factors behind the accident 
(Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009). To shun this negative influence, a better 
understanding and workable analysis causation model to direct accident investigation 
methodology is an alternative need.  
On the other hand, in order to better understand the concept of “human error” or 
“human factor” and the accident, the need for an appropriate accident causation 
model becomes clear. It is generally recognized that human error is attributed to the 
majority of maritime accidents (Harrald et al, 1998; Trucco, Cagno, Ruggeri & 
Grande, 2008). Each year in the maritime industry, financial loss caused by human 
error is far more than 400 million pounds in the forms of ones’ loss business, jobs 
and ruining reputation, or even spending the rest of life in prison (UK P&I Club, 
2003).It is easy to off-hand attribute the accident occurrence to the human error or 
human factor. However, the terms “human error” and “human factor” are often 
exchanged in the safety industry but without distinguishing the meanings of these 
labels. Even to the professional accident investigators among transportation 
administrations, there is no such thing as a professional usage of the human factor 
but a spectrum of meanings (Korolija & Lundberg, 2010). The negative way people 
understanding human error or the human factor always pushes them merely to assign 
the liability of the accident to the “bad apple” (Dekker, 2002, 2006) in hindsight. 
Often, investigators also tend to identify the person who seems to be the most 
responsible for the accident, but leave the root cause hidden. This phenomenon often 
takes place in maritime industry (UK P&I Club, 2003), where large numbers of 
examples can be found in maritime history, such as the PRESTIGE pollution incident 
in 2002 and HEBEI SPIRIT disaster in 2007 where both captains were blamed for 
their so-called negligence even though they had made reasonable efforts to prevent 
 3
the accidents. However, from the perspective of the preventive measures, a change of 
human behaviour through selection of better personnel, will be of little avail and no 
well-controlled study convincingly shows that a decrease of accident rate can be 
achieved by general safety-training or motivation programs (Wagenaar & 
Groeneweg, 1987, p.587) . 
In fact, the concept of human error in industrial environments and transportation 
systems appears to be far more sophisticated to interpret than simply blaming the 
operator (Reinach & Viale, 2006). Recently, however, the increasing research 
(Brown & Haugene, 1998; Gordon, 1997; Kongsvik, Almklov & Fenstad, 2010; 
Reason, 1990, 1997; Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009; Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 
1987) has intimated that in consideration of human error, organizational factors are 
in need to be specially taken account of. Time has come to accept these methods that 
control safety performance other than by simply telling frontline operators not to do 
stupidly. For instance, the high-value “Swiss cheese” model created by Reason (1990; 
1997; 2008) in better comprehending the accident, divides the failures in 
organizational accidents (in sharp contrast to individual accidents) into two groups: 
active failures at the sharp end and latent failures at blunt end. Woods, Johannesen, 
Cook and Sarter (1994) further defined the relative connection between sharp end 
and blunt end that failures made at the sharp end are determined by those at blunt end. 
Reason’s model (1990; 1997; 2008) has been highly appreciated by a large number 
of researchers. One of them is Barnett (2005) who noted that the contributions of 
such a model make the determination of a single cause for any accident virtually 
impossible, despite the shortage of practical application (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001). In maritime industrial practice, the United Kingdom’s Maritime 
Administration (IMO, 2004) has highlighted a group of findings from a number of 
accidents associated with the deficiencies of the ISM Code, which primarily deals 
with standardizing the organizational control in the safety field. We have learned 
from this research, e.g. Brown & Haugene’s work (1998), that organizational factors 
are essential for accident analysis in accident investigations, particularly in the 
maritime industry where the ISM Code needs to be considered.  
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In our routine practice of maritime accident investigations, a proper accident 
causation model is needed in order to fully consider all the possible factors which 
may influence system failures. This causation model will not only help investigators 
to conceptualize human error in an appropriate manner, but also direct data collection 
and accident analysis. In addition, the elements of the ISM Code are highly directive 
to those factors influential on safety performance. What are the roles of the 
organizational factors in the context of maritime safety? What is a proper accident 
causation model incorporating the elements of ISM Code? Is such an adapted 
accident causation framework applicable in specific maritime cases? In response to 
the above questions, this paper has been developed by combining the proper 
academic theories and their empirical applications.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This study attempts to achieve the following objectives:  
1. Describe the organizational functions of the ISM Code; 
2. Discuss the feasibility of establishment of the connection between the selected 
causation model and ISM Code;  
3. Adapt a proper accident causation model incorporating the elements of the ISM 
Code; 
4. Test the applicability of adapted accident causation model into two specific 
cases; 
5. Discuss the role of organizational factors in the context of maritime safety; 
6. Discuss the verification of the adapted causation model; 
7. Make some recommendations on how to apply the adapted causation model. 
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1.3 Methodology 
In order to achieve the above described tasks in the given time period, the selection 
of proper methodology is necessary. The commonly used research methodologies 
can be generally be divided into two groups, namely quantitative methodology and 
qualitative methodology, each having its pros and cons. In contrast to the qualitative 
methodology, the quantitative methodology is often preferred by decision makers in 
practices due to its easy of application and readiness in terms of figures and graphs. 
Challenging in applying the qualitative methodology into practice, e.g. the lack of 
sufficient theoretical foundation, increases the difficulties in application of the 
qualitative methodology. 
Despite these difficulties, the qualitative methodology has been decided to be the 
prior option for this research due to the fact that some sensitive accident reports or 
details are unlikely to be exposed to public scrutiny. The lack of sufficient accident 
reports may impair the accuracy of this research or even make this study void. In 
addition, the construction of mathematical models for the quantitative approach is a 
demanding and time-consuming job which may not be practically completed within a 
couple of months.  
Given the introduction of the background, human error, as the predominant cause of 
marine casualties, it should be interpreted as the factors not only related to the 
operator’s error at the proximal end, but also associated with the organizational 
factors at the remote end. All the possible factors in relation to the event failure 
should be taken into account in the causation model below.  
In searching the required accident report, two criteria for determination are in need of 
consideration. Firstly, the investigation should be completed and the accident 
information should be released as reasonably as it should be. Secondly, one is 
suggested to be more sophisticated than the other. Hence, two accident reports have 
been selected randomly under the two criteria aforementioned. The first case locks 
on to the historic disaster of the foundering of the vessel Estonia, leading to 852 
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deaths and the sinking of the vessel, mainly relating to human error apart from some 
technical failures exposed. The application attempts to shun any new source of 
evidence aside from the facts revealed by the official report. This paper tries to 
provide the comparison of different approaches on their applications, as well as the 
same in the second case regarding the QINGFENG 128 flying Chinese flag which 
collided with a constructing bridge, an accident that led to 4 deaths.  
During the period of searching for the literature material to establishing the essential 
theoretical basis, the author was heavily shocked by two phenomena: firstly, the few 
sources of maritime studies on theoretical development associated with maritime 
safety issues in comparison to other industries; in particular most articles on 
maritime issues have been written decades ago. Even in response to the compulsory 
report to IMO, the database in GISIS proved conclusively to be insufficient, 
specifically that inadequate relevant details were released in the submitted reports 
(IMO, 2010). It seems that the maritime industry lacks motivation to do academic 
research on this issue. This may be one of the reasons why the theoretical 
development has often lagged behind other transport sectors, especially the aviation 
field. Secondly, as for the accident reports, the sensitive/shamefulness makes the 
authorities unwilling to fully open the information to the public. The Academic 
researchers often complain about the lack of any complete and structured accident 
database, which heavily impedes the development speed of a safety theory in the 
maritime industry. In contrast, most of the aviation reports have been published with 
more details and less hidden information. This is one reason why more and deeper 
research is carried out in aviation safety rather than maritime safety.  
In spite of these negative issues, the author has still managed to make more 
endeavours to reach a valuable and workable result for the maritime industry.  
1.4 Limitations of the study 
Not only the learning from an extensive range of literature reviews, but also the 
author’s empirical opinion gained from a decade of work and study involved in 
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profession of maritime accident investigation in administration is applied to this 
study. The accuracy of this study is constrained by the extent of how vast and deep 
the literature review is and how far the author will conclude experience from 
practice.  
Furthermore, the limited quantity of case studies also reflects the constraints of this 
study. In order to further validate the findings from this paper, further studies need to 
be considered.  
1.5 Plan of the study 
This dissertation is mainly divided into six main chapters. The first chapter begins 
with a preliminary explanatory background of the topic giving the motivation for and 
methodology of this research. The prevailing ISM Code dealing with organizational 
control in terms of safety performance is discussed in Chapter Two, followed ´by the 
identification of organizational factors in the ISM Code in connection with the 
causation model. After that, the selection of a proper causation model is determined 
on the basis of certain given principles. In consideration of the practical situations of 
maritime accident investigation and organizational factors in the ISM Code, the 
selected causation model is adapted so as to apply it in practice. Chapter Three 
contains two case studies, representing a complicated and a simple case. These case 
studies start with a summary of the official report, facts and analyses, then gives the 
re-analysis of cases by the new framework perspective. Some findings in short are 
observed from the applications described at the end of each case study followed by 
the subsequent discussion. Chapter Four discusses the findings in terms of roles of 
organizational factors. In Chapter Five, the verification of the new developed 
framework is discussed. Last but not least, the concluding parts are placed in Chapter 
Six, followed by some recommendations on how to apply the new model in practice 
as perceived through the applications. 
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 Chapter 2 ISM Code and HFACS model 
 
In order to verify an accident causation model in specific cases and assess the role of 
organizational factors in the maritime context by employment of such a model, 
proper theoretical foundation and an appropriate accident causation model need to be 
established and determined with reference to the organizational factors. The 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code (IMO, 2002) which aims at enhancing 
the safety performance on board by consolidation of organizational functions, is 
described and reviewed in this chapter, as well as the identification of the 
organizational factors in the ISM Code. Then, its connection in terms of the 
organizational factors with the targeted model is established. In addition, a proper 
accident causation model is selected, adapted and adopted in consideration of its aim 
to address the significance of the organizational factors in the maritime context. 
2.1 The International Safety Management Code 
The lessons learned from serious accidents during the 1980s, such as the HERALD 
OF FREE ENTERPRISE, pointed out the importance of organizational factors and 
that impact on accident casualties. In particular poor management plays a central role 
in these accidents (Whittingham, 2004, p.120; IMO, 2005). To meet the needs of 
addressing overall organizational functions, the ISM Code was adopted in 1993 by 
IMO Resolution A.741(18) (IMO, 2005). In sharp contrast to much other maritime 
legislation, the ISM Code specifically focuses on the management of people and 
processed in the maritime industry, perhaps for the first time.   
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The implementation and enforcement of the ISM Code resulted in a dramatic 
improvement in safety and environmental performance of the industry (Figure 2), 
impressively with growth in the volume of the world fleet by almost 50%. (ICS & 
ISF, 2010). This appealing result was supported by an assessment to the impact of 
the ISM Code on the safety of ships by IMO three years after implementing on the 
remaining world fleet (IMO, 2005). As a specific case, the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the implemented ISM Code in the Greek fleet further justified its 
positive control on organizational factors in the shipping industry by analyzing the 
factors related to human error by scrutinizing all accidents over the pre- and 
post-ISM period (Tzannatos & Kokotos, 2009). 
 
Figure 2 Reduction of Total Ship Losses by Number (Ships over 500 GT) 
Source: International Union of Maritime Insurance, 2010 
The ISM Code itself is a thin document seeing that it is functional in outcome rather 
than in process (Trafford, 2009), an indication of the need for flexibility and 
adaptability in its implementing process (ICS & ISF, 2010). The overall objective of 
the ISM Code is to encourage the shipping companies to establish the Safety 
Management System for safety compliance with relevant international regulations. 
The required Safety Management System shall constitute the company’s safety and 
environmental protection policies, instructions and procedures for the safe operations 
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of the vessel, procedures for the reporting of reporting accidents and 
non-conformities, procedures to prepare for emergency situations as well as for 
internal audits and management review (Pamborides, Holman, Fenwick & Willan, 
1996).  
The explicit requirement of prevailing risk assessment has been incorporated into the 
new amendments of the ISM Code which have entered into force by 1 July, 2010 
(IMO, 2008b). In compliance with the Code, the Company is obligated to establish 
proper procedures to assess and manage all identified risk on board in relation to the 
safety operation in a proper way as thorough and detailed as possible. The 
requirement of risk assessment should be seen more than only paper document and 
work to be done by the company. 
The ISM Code itself is regarded as a piece of a legal “umbrella” (Herbert-Burns, 
Bateman & Lehr, 2009) with a coverage of all the requirements on the vessel and 
further extends the full responsibility to its company for safety compliance. It has 
been noted that the innovative idea of involving management into shipping at the 
legal level was inspired by large amounts of findings of a series of disasters from 
which the authorities observed the absent function of management as the chief 
factors which led to the accidents. It highlights the organizational controls in 
contribution to maritime safety. By all means, inter alia, the legal requirements and 
the unwritten or written guidance formulated from the long-run best maritime 
practice and common sense, the company is obligated to ensure that the ship is in a 
seaworthy condition at the commencement of its voyage. These elements in the Code 
provide us with a reliably legal reference for analyzing the organizational factors in 
the context below. In the case of a response to the contingency plan, for instance, 
crew members are instructed to follow the procedure described in the contingency 
plan. If they fail to prevent the occurrence or minimize the consequences by 
observing the procedure, the management level is responsible for realizing such an 
incremental need of perfecting such a procedure in terms of effectiveness and quality. 
On the other hand, if the crew does not follow the procedure or follow the procedure 
in a proper manner, further improvement should be made to enhance the education or 
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training of the crew for the familiarization of the contingency response by the 
company. In other words, the company should ensure that its employees follow the 
proper instructions so as to complete their performance well, and in the case of 
contingency, appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the potential consequence in 
which the loss of life or property may occur. The organizational factors at the remote 
end always go along with their influence on the proximal operation in accordance 
with the stipulations in the Code. The management at each level of the organization 
should therefore be aware of the importance of their functions; any tiny mishap of 
which may lead to a disaster at the sharp end, and take care of the ship with due 
diligence. Such emphasis of the fundamental function of organization in the ISM 
Code constitutes the legal framework to assess the role of organizational factors in 
maritime industry performance. This is further discussed in detail below. 
2.2 Identification of the organizational factors in the ISM Code 
To justify as to whether the organizational factors are properly functional or not, or 
whether the responsible company acts in a reasonable or prudent way, in terms of 
Safety Management System, depends on the following two elements: firstly, whether 
the company has established an appropriate Safety Management System, and 
secondly, whether the company takes proper actions to ensure the effective running 
of the system. To clarify such questions, the identification of the organizational 
factors involved in the Code becomes more than necessary.  
In order to establish the linkage in relation to organizational factors between the ISM 
Code and the selected model to be used, the general organizational function of the 
ISM Code can be grouped into two categories: organizational influences which 
represent the latent failures at the organizational level and further end away from the 
seafarers end within the hierarchy of organization and supervision, on which the top 
organization relies to fulfil its overall objective. Moreover, having been inspired by 
the classification approach in Reason’s model (1990; 1997; 2008), the organizational 
influences can be further divided into three sub-groups: resource, climate and process, 
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while the supervision factors compose four families: inadequate supervision, planned 
inappropriate operations, failure to correct a problem and supervisory violations. 
More details about these factors are discussed in section 2.4 on how to adapt the 
accident causation model. 
In scrutinizing the context of the ISM Code, this has been stated in the form of 
general principles and objectives as argued above. This leads to the divergent 
interpretations of the elements in the Code. Thereby, IACS made its unified 
interpretation available for industrial reference to facilitate the Code’s 
implementation (IMO, 1995). Anyhow, whatever the interpretation is, the 
involvement of the organizational factors in the context is sure. The real context to 
stipulate in detail what the outcome shall be made begins with element 2, concerning 
the company’s safety and environmental protection policy, while element 1 refers to 
the associated definitions and general requirements to its applications. In element 2.1, 
the company is obligated to set a safety and environmental protection policy 
addressing how to achieve the overall objective of SMS, while all means shall be 
taken into account of the effective fulfilling of the company’s policy at every level as 
its general legal obligation. 
In the following element, the company shall not reduce its assumed responsibility 
imposed by the Code to be in control of all associated activities. The level of the 
authority and lines of communication in relation to the safety operation shall be 
clearly defined and documented by the company. A designated person shall be 
appointed and ensured to be acted as a linkage between top management and its ship, 
in order to ensure the sufficient resource support the board and monitor performance 
of each ship by element 4. Besides, adequate resources and shore-based support from 
the company shall be made available to the designated person for his complete 
performance. Both full responsibilities and authorization of implementation and 
verification of the requirements shall be authorized to the master by the company on 
its behalf (element 5). The seafarers manned by the company on board, in particular 
the master, are required to be qualified, certified and medically fit, with adequate 
ability of understanding the related rules and effective communication. Effective 
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updated training shall be proceduralized and given to meet the need of seafarers’ 
proficient performance (element 6). 
The entire key operations on board shall be identified and assessed in advance and 
documented with preparation of plans and instructions to standardize its critical 
shipboard operations. In addition, each operation shall be assigned to the proper 
personnel (element 7). Element 8 of the ISM Code stipulates the possibility of the 
company to prepare corresponding measures for capping any possibly potential 
threat. It has been noted that with its responsibility the company shall identify all 
possible sources of potential threats and establish proper procedures to reduce the 
possibility of conveyance of the potential threat into practice, plus programming 
some appropriate associated exercises and drills.  
Element 9 provides the system with an ability to self-learn and improve. 
Corresponding procedures to report non-conformities and accidents and 
corresponding correction measures shall be established for the purpose of monitoring 
its performance and enhancing its ability to self advance. One of the innovations of 
the ISM Code requires record keeping for routine ship maintenance which shall be in 
line with the relevant regulations, including ensuring the routine inspections, and 
reporting and correcting deficiencies. The company shall ensure that the critical 
equipment and system be recognized and all possible measures ought to be taken to 
the incremental reliability of the equipment and system.  
The last two elements stipulate that the documentation and internal safety audit 
within both the ship and the company itself shall be carried out in accordance with 
the requirements of the Code. The company shall ensure all the relevant and updated 
documents are available on board. The internal safety audit provides an opportunity 
of review and correction to perfect the SMS.  
The above analyzed organizational factors in contributing to maritime safety are 
introduced in Table 1. In addition, as mentioned above, a structure to define the 
organizational factors is given in the table as well. The table gives a short description 
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of each element in the context of the Code and a brief organizational function of each 
element.  
Element The ISM Code Descriptions Organizational functions 
2.1 Statement of company’s policy. Climate. 
2.2 Implementation and maintenance of policy. Climate. 
3.1 Report its responsible company to authority. Climate. 
3.2 
Responsibility, authority and interrelation of 
related personnel. 
Resources and process 
3.3 Adequate resource and shore-based support. Resources. 
4 Designated persons. 
Resources, climate and 
inadequate supervision. 
5.1 Responsibility of the master. 
Climate and Inadequate 
supervision. 
5.2 Overriding authority of the master. Climate and Resources. 
6.1 Qualification of the master. Resources and Process. 
6.2 Seafarers’ qualification. Resources and Process. 
6.3 Procedure of new assignments. 
Process, and shipborne and 
shore supervision. 
6.4 Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules. Resource. 
6.5 Training requirements. 
Resources, process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
6.6 Linguistic requirements to seafarers. 
Resource and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
6.7 
Effective communication capability of 
personnel. 
Resources and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
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7 Plans for shipboard operations. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
8.1 Identification of potential threats. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
8.2 Drill and exercises. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
8.3 Measures to respond the hazard and accidents. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
9.1 Non-conformities and accident report. 
Process, failed to correct known 
problems and Supervisory violations 
9.2 Implementation of corrective action. 
Process and failed to correct 
known problems 
10.1 Statutory maintenance. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
10.2 Routine inspections. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
10.3 Specific actions to the system failures. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
10.4 Routine maintenance and test. 
Process and planned in 
appropriate operation. 
11.1 Procedure to control documentation and data. Process. 
11.2 Updated and available documentation. Resources. 
11.3 Effective control of documentation. Process. 
12 Company verification, review and evaluation. 
Process, failed to correct know problems 
and supervisory violations. 
Table 1 An overview to the function of the ISM Code in terms of the organizational factors. 
Source: Author. 
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2.3 The selection of the accident causation model 
The selection of the accident causation model for this study should be determined on 
the basis of its capability to meet our requirements and preferences. Both the 
theoretical and pragmatic concerns should be considered concerning the 
organizational factors. By and large, in accordance with the discussed norms of a 
systemic model (Leveson, 2004) that is in parallel with Hollnagel’s (2009, p.10) 
three standards of a ‘good’ cause as well as ten criteria proposed by Benner (1985, 
p.113), the causation model being chose should preferably be: 
1. Adequately burgeoned theoretic foundation to support the model’s adaptation, 
i.e. with a sound basis from safety management theory (particularly the 
organizational factors indicated in Chapter 1) and accident analysis theory. 
2. Structured and classified, i.e. clearly define the interaction of classified 
components at the divergent levels. 
3. The selected model’s applicability enough to cap all maritime accident and 
incident data. This means, the framework of such a model should be adequate 
to accommodate all underlying accident factors in its application. 
In searching for the desired model, the author found the traditional models often used 
in practice to analyze accident investigations do not fit the three norms above, as the 
literature review (Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009, p.1310) on 
investigatory manuals of eight Swedish organizations which rely on linear models 
demonstrated the need of more systemic models in practice. Fortunately, a proposed 
accident causation model, namely Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) model (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; 2003; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001), initially developed for the U.S. Military on the basis of Reason’s 
model (1990; 1997) system, meets the demands above.  
It has been learned that the HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory - its 
original model - Reason’s model (1990; 1997) and practices by providing 
investigators with a “comprehensive, user-friendly tool” for identifying and 
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classifying the human causes of accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2003). Such an incident analysis approach supported by a structured 
taxonomy captures the range of active failures at the proximal side and latent 
conditions at the remote side. This is why it prevails in the aviation field (Dambier & 
Hinkelbein, 2006; Gaur, 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001) and a variety of other 
industries such as mining, oil, manufacturing, and medicine. For the maritime 
industry, Celik and Cebi (2009) have proposed an analytical foundation for such a 
model quantitatively characterizes the role of latent human errors by extending such 
a model in a fuzzy environment to investigate shipping accidents. Its findings 
pinpoint human error as contributing factors at different levels of the organization. 
The HFACS model, after adaptation, was applied on a group of 41 accident 
investigation reports concerning machinery space fire and explosion by Ghirxi 
(2008). Its results have disclosed the need to investigate organizational factors which 
should be taken care of as important as the technical failures in maritime accident 
investigation. 
Thereby, the HFACS model chiefly aims at solving the organizational factors in line 
with the ISM Code, but in different ways. The following section focuses on how to 
adapt the HFACS model in combination with the organizational factors identified in 
the ISM Code in order to optimize its applicability in specific cases. 
2.4 Integrate the ISM Code into Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System model 
Since the similarities between the Reason’s model adopted by IMO (1997) and the 
HFACS model and the linkage between the ISM Code and HFACS model have been 
established previously, the possibility of applying the HFACS model in maritime 
accident analysis becomes clear. To ensure all maritime factors involving the 
HFACS model, and merging all the organizational factors defined in the ISM Code 
into the HFACS model, the need to address the proper adaptation of the HFACS 
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model, which was originally designed for aviation, becomes necessary. The next 
section describes the revised HFACS model while considering Ghirxi’s (2008) 
adapted framework and its origin from the US. Department of Defense (2005) in 
hopes of being faithful to its origin and being practicable. The adapted model 
includes five levels of failures: unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe 
supervision/workplace factors, organizational influences and social environment 
influences, as explain below: 
Unsafe Acts. The unsafe acts of seafarers can be generally categorized into two 
groups: errors and violations (Reason, 1990). Errors, as the nature of the human 
being, constitute skill-based, decision and perceptual errors, while the violations 
include routine and exceptional violations. These unsafe acts are directly or 
indirectly influenced through certain middle parts by the organizational factors which 
more likely endanger the sharp end. 
Skill-based errors refer to the failures without significant conscious thought. Within 
the context of the maritime field, a lot of actions formed by conventional or 
long-term practice are very vulnerable considering the fact that they always suffer 
from the lack of attention or memory failure. During the safety patrol to pipe 
connection operation before pumping oil to shore side, skill-based errors happen 
often in ticking the checklist by assuming everything is perfect. Decision errors are 
occurred when a problem is not well understood, and formal procedures and response 
options are not available within SMS. In the maritime context, vessels when visiting 
some ports without any knowledge about the local meteorological conditions often 
need a pilot to service berthing for the purpose of avoiding decision errors. 
Perceptual errors take place comparative less often than skill-based and decision 
errors in the maritime realm. Such factors are in a mishap when failure occurs in the 
perception of an object, threat or situation, resulting in a sluggish response to the 
action. 
Routine violations appear to be acceptable in a situation where no sanction or action 
could be taken to prevent their occurrence. A proper lookout is often absent during 
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navigation under low visible condition due to insufficient manning, however, such a 
violation may not always lead to accidents. Routine violations happen on board with 
the situation where the SMS does not follow all requirements of ISM Code, an 
indication of something wrong in its manuals or procedures without coverage of all 
the compulsory requirements, or their implementations. For instance, the internal 
interval audit requires the line management to verify, review, analyze and correct 
deficiencies and non-conformities on board, including such violations. There may be 
some reasons for such violations, such as time pressure or deficiencies in the 
procedures. However, for the shipping company, the tolerance of the routine 
violations is assumed to be zero so that such violations will not be accumulated until 
the accident occurs. As to exceptional violations, it may be attributed to the 
speculation that operators assume these violations may not lead to a disaster. For 
instance, vessel’s violation may be made by crossing the prohibited water area for a 
short voyage against the time pressure.  
The identification of unsafe acts has been proven to be fundamental so as to 
determine who will be liable for the disaster, in particular in the event of involving 
technical failure or unexpected meteorological circumstances. On board, even 
well-prepared contingency plans cannot cover all emergency situations. Therefore, 
seafarers are required to be able to make a proper and timely response with no 
procedure to refer to. It is notable that currently people tend to off-handly attribute 
the failure to human error in the end with an ignorance of the fundamental role of 
technical failure and managerial deficiencies. Given that the crew has exercised due 
diligence in their responsibilities, in the event of exceptional stormy weather, people 
at the sharp end are in the realm of possibility to be blamed for their unsafe acts to 
respond to the emergency, even though this may be due to, at least partly, the 
technical failure being triggered by an unexpected storm.  
Preconditions for unsafe acts. This step provides deeper analysis than the unsafe 
acts on the internal or external circumstance that makes unsafe acts more likely to 
happen. Exploring the preconditions for unsafe acts allows us to understand the 
factors behind the unsafe acts. The preconditions for unsafe acts are divided into 
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three categories: condition of crew members; environmental factors and personal 
factors. 
Condition of crew members can be classified into two groups: cognitive factors and 
physiological state. Theoretically, both the cognitive factors and physiological state 
play fundamental roles in driving people to commit unsafe acts. These factors vary 
from diverse people at distinct stages and are not easy to be observed and studied, 
especially in some cases where no seafarer concerned survives. In most maritime 
cases, no such condition of crew members could be investigated unless such factors 
stand out from the effect of unsafe acts. In accordance with the HFACS Quick Users 
Guide by U.S. Department of Defense (2005), 8 types of factors, like inattention and 
distraction, affect the cognitive factors, with a total of more than 47 types of 
conditions, including but not limited to fatigue and motion sickness, are considered 
in the realm of possibility to make the personal physiological state dysfunctional. 
Internal environmental factors are primarily divided into two groups, the physical 
and the technological environmental factors. The physical environmental factors 
contain the internal in which the seafarer works and operates. The technological 
environment normally looks into the technological condition of ships, including the 
workspace design and equipment technological condition, depending upon what sort 
of accident is being investigated. 
Personal factors are traditionally divided into two staple categories: crew interaction 
and personal readiness. Crew interaction among the bridge team is a symbolic factor 
when investigating a collision case. In particular nowadays, the increasing presence 
of multiple-national seafarers has emphasized the importance of crew interaction in 
bridge management. In addition, personal readiness shows the extent to which the 
seafarers are familiar with the fresh situations. In the ISM Code, the responsible 
company is required to ensure the adequacy of familiarization with the new position 
on board. Lack of personal readiness should not be interpreted as violation.  
Unsafe supervision/workplace factors. At this level, four categories of unsafe 
supervision have been tagged, namely inadequate supervision, planned 
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inappropriate operations, failure to correct a problem and supervisory violations. 
Failure occurring at this level mostly refers to the management level on board which 
directly affects and is approached by the organizational factors. The top management 
intensively relies on this level to realize its management objective in the ISM Code 
on board; the factors at this level are thereby highly related to the organizational 
factors in the ISM Code at a higher level. 
Inadequate supervision principally refers to the shipborne and shore supervision of 
operations on board. One of the responsibilities required by the ISM Code of the 
master is verifying that the specified requirements are observed. By the company’s 
documented definition of the master’s responsibility, the master on behalf of the 
company monitors and supervises the ship’s performance together with other senior 
officers’ on board. In some cases, it shows the lack of supervision by the master to 
approve and scrutinize the planned route leading to a grounding accident (Brown & 
Haugene, 1998).  
Planned inappropriate operations mainly address the shipborne operations that are 
required by the ISM Code to the company which is due to maintain adequate and 
proper procedures and plans of shipborne operations. Any inadequate or improper 
procedures or plans of shipborne operations may increase the possibility of the onset 
of an unsafe act, ultimately resulting in accidents. These operations include the 
emergency preparedness on board as required in element 8 of the ISM Code for 
instance. 
Failure to correct known problems just reflect one of the most elementary features of 
the SMS. The system requires the company to establish proper procedures to report 
non-conformity and mishaps, and also trace such a deficiency until it is corrected or 
mitigated at a satisfactory level. Within the ship, proper procedures should be 
established and exercised to report and correct the problems so as to improve the 
safety of ship operations. Take the chart small correction as an example. Failures to 
exercise the chart small correction could be in such a category to increase the 
possibility of a grounding or collision. 
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Supervisory violations at this level reflect the tolerance to which extent the 
management level on board can be accepted with the routine violations committed at 
the sharp end. This is somehow related to the company’s safety policy and culture 
and to the extent the routine violation can be accepted. In similarity to a tiny screw in 
a machine, under certain conditions routine violations become more likely to result in 
a tragic disaster when combined with other factors. Nowadays with the shortage of 
senior seafarers, the acceptance of people with fraudulent certificates in some small 
size vessels may jeopardize the safety of all crew.  
Organizational Influences. Organizational influences as renowned latent failures are 
at the top level and farthest end from the crew members within the hierarchy of the 
organization. Four organizational factors have been labeled as follows: resource 
management, organizational climate, organizational process and statutory, all of 
which affect the supervisory actions, as well as the conditions and unsafe acts of 
seafarers. The aim of the ISM Code is to require the company to establish and 
maintain a proper procedure and plan to ensure sufficient resources to support the 
ship, cultivate a proper climate within the organization and address appropriate 
organizational processes. In line with the Reason’s “cheese” model, the introduction 
of the ISM Code provides a complete view of how to plug the “holes” in the 
“cheese” up at the level of organization influence until they are penetrated and 
developed and an accident comes up. 
Resource management includes all the resources the ship needs, i.e. human resources, 
technological environment and equipment/facility resources. Adequate resource 
support plays a key role in ensuring the system to maintain at an acceptable and 
stable safety level. For instance, safety always becomes a loser in the battle of 
fighting against resource support with productivity. In addressing this conflict and 
prioritizing safety, the ISM Code specifically sets up a designated person to ensure 
that there are adequate resources and shore-based support. In the aspect of 
technological environment and equipment resources support, the company is 
obligated to make sure that proper measures are taken to ensure the company can 
respond at any time to resource demand from its ships.  
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Organizational Climate is to seek to define proper organizational structure, policies 
and culture within the organization. Element 3.2 in the ISM Code provides the 
requirements for the company to define and document the responsibility, authority 
and interrelation of all personnel related to safety management. For the policy, the 
Code stipulates not only the aims to achieve in terms of safety and environmental 
protection, but also the requirements to ensure how the aims are fulfilled and 
maintained. Safety culture is the collective perception and practice on safety issues 
within the organization (Toft & Reynolds, 1997, p.15). Take the master’s overriding 
authority as an example; an organization’s priority of the master’s professional 
decision-making in terms of safety and environmental protection can be viewed as 
one component of safety culture. 
Organizational process refers to the established operation plans and processes, 
documented procedures and oversight. One of the most outstanding features of the 
ISM Code is that it requires the company to document and standardize the operations 
for the purpose of minimizing random and mistake operations. Such operations and 
procedures include not only the routine operations and maintenance, but also the 
emergent response; assisting the concerned people to observe the standard operation 
sooner. Oversight refers to the system audit which provides an opportunity of overall 
or partial scrutiny of the entire system, and the risk assessment. It is incumbent upon 
any organization to cordially seek out the weakness of management and address it 
through risk assessment approach for instance.  
Social environment influences. This is an additional component in contrast to the 
original HFACS framework, inspired by the Safety Control Theory of 
“Human-Machine-Environment-Management” argued by Chen (1988) in his paper 
and the systemic view to look into an organization as living with unpredictable 
environment (Hollnagel, 2009, p.38). The social environment’s influences can be 
subdivided into two categories: Statutory and external environment. They have 
strong influence on both the shore management and the ship. In turn, both levels may 
have the possibility of minimizing the social influence by improving management 
and technology.  
 24
Statutory is to reflect long-term social requirements. The reality that the development 
of legislation always lags behind the tempo of technological innovation makes it 
possible to seek the “holes” at this legislative level. It is necessary to address two 
groups, namely international/national standards and administration implementation/ 
enforcement in this respect. The administration relies on the implementation of the 
international/national standards to realize the safety management of its national fleet. 
Notwithstanding, drastically innovative techniques often disconcert the slow 
legislative development which may result in an inadequate safety standard. 
Conventionally, the implementation and enforcement of statutory documentation 
upon fleet depends upon the flag state administration, plus the port state 
administration which plays as a supplementary role. In spite of the fact that no 
requirement is imposed upon the company with regard to the responsibility of 
statutory legislation in addition to its compliance, it is necessary for the company to 
work together with the legislative agency by providing it with feedback. 
External environment refers to the outside environment of the organization or ship in 
sharp contrast to the physical environment of the operator. It mainly refers to the 
meteorological factors, such as weather conditions which are often viewed as the 
main factors that trigger the onset of an accident. Such factors reflect the vulnerable 
feature of maritime safety when it encounters extreme meteorological conditions. For 
instance, heavy fog may reduce the physical visibility of the operator, and then 
increases the possibility of a collision at sea. Political/economic factors reflect the 
short term social demand. For instance, the economic recession that started from the 
end of 2008 may lead to a reduction of resource investment in safety in order to 
maintain the commercial operations due to a limited budget. These reductions may 
increase the possibility of maritime risks at sea. The third one is navigation aids or 
conditions referring to the outside navigation environment, such as the VTS, light 
buoy or some other items that may influence the safety of navigation as well. 
In conclusion, an overview of the adapted HFACS framework (table 2) combined 
with the functions of the ISM Code, is described and discussed above. The adapted 
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HFACS framework gives us a new view with reference to how the ISM Code seeks 
the “holes” within an organization and addresses them at all organizational levels. By 
integrating the organizational factors into the HFACS framework, the significance of 
organizational factors identified in the ISM Code is assumed to be fundamental in 
defense of maritime safety which is applied into practice and further discussed in the 
following chapters.
HFACS framework 
1st Tier 2nd Tier 3rd Tier ISM Descriptions 
ISM 
Code 
Statutory 
? International/national 
standards 
? Administration 
Implementation/enforcement
?  ?  
Social 
Environment 
influences 
External 
environment 
? Meteorological factors 
? Political/economic factors 
? Navigation aids/conditions
?  ?  
Resources 
? Human Resources 
? Technological 
Environment 
? Equipment/Facility 
Resources 
? Definition of responsibility, authority and 
interrelation of related personnel 
? Adequate resource and shore-based support 
? Designed persons 
? Authority of the master 
? Qualification of the master 
? Seafarers’ qualification 
? Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules 
? Training requirements 
? Linguistic requirements to seafarers 
? Effective communication capability of personnel
? Statutory maintenance support 
? Updated and availabe documentation 
? 3.2 
? 3.3 
? 4 
? 5.2 
? 6.1 
? 6.2 
? 6.4 
? 6.5 
? 6.6 
? 6.7 
? 10.1 
? 11.2 
Organizational 
Influences 
Organizational 
climate 
? Structure 
? Policies 
? Culture 
? Statement of company’s policy 
? Implementation and maintenance of policy 
? Report its responsible company to authority 
? Definition of responsibility, authority and 
interrelation of related personnel 
? 2.1 
? 2.2 
? 3.1 
? 3.2 
? 4 
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? Designated persons 
? Responsibility of the master 
? Authority of the master 
? 5.1 
? 5.2 
Organizational 
Process 
? Operations 
? Procedures 
? Checks and balances 
? Qualification of the master 
? Seafarers’ qualification 
? Process of the new assignments 
? Training requirements 
? Plans for shipboard operations 
? Identification of potential threats 
? Drill and exercises 
? Measures to respond the hazard and accidents 
? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Implementation of corrective action 
? Statutory maintenance 
? Routine inspections 
? Procedure to control documentation and data 
? Effective control of documentation 
? Company verification, review and evaluation 
? 6.1 
? 6.2 
? 6.3 
? 6.4 
? 7 
? 8.1 
? 8.2 
? 8.3 
? 9.1 
? 9.2 
? 10.1 
? 10.2 
? 11.1 
? 11.3 
? 12 
Inadequate 
supervision 
? Shipborne and shore 
supervision 
? Designated persons 
? Responsibility of the master 
? Procedure of new assignments 
? 4 
? 5.1 
? 6.3 
Unsafe 
supervision/ 
workplace factors 
Planned in 
appropriate 
operations 
? Ship borne operations ? Training requirements 
? Linguistic requirements to seafarers 
? Effective communication capability of personnel
? Plans for shipboard operations 
? Identification of potential threats. 
? Drill and exercise 
? 6.5 
? 6.6 
? 6.7 
? 7 
? 8.1 
? 8.2 
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? Measures to respond the hazard and accidents 
? Statutory maintenance 
? Routine inspections 
? Specific actions to the system failures 
? Routine maintenance and test 
? 8.3 
? 10.1 
? 10.2 
? 10.3 
? 10.4 
Failed to correct 
known problems 
? Shipborne related 
shortcomings 
? Measures to respond the hazard and accidents 
? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Implementation of corrective action 
? 8.3 
? 9.1 
? 9.2 
Supervisory 
violations 
? Shipborne violations ? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Company verification, review and evaluation 
? 9.1 
Internal 
Environmental 
factors 
? Physical 
? Technological 
?  ?  
Condition of crew 
members 
? Cognitive factors 
? Physiological state 
?  ?  Preconditions for 
unsafe acts 
Personal factors 
? Crew resources 
managment 
? Personal readiness 
?  ?  
Error 
? Skill-based 
? Decision 
? Perceptional 
?  ?  
Unsafe acts 
Violation ? Routine ? Exceptional 
?  ?  
Table 2 An overview of the adapted HFACS framework based on the framework developed by the US. Department of Defense. 
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Source: Author.
 
 Chapter 3 Case Studies 
 
Since proper theoretical foundation has been established and an appropriate 
causation model has been adapted and adopted, the next step is moving to test its 
applicability in practice. This chapter focuses on case studies that apply the model in 
two diverse specific maritime cases with the purpose of seeking the feasibility of 
application of the adapted HFACS framework into specific maritime cases and 
acquiring evidence of how the organizational factors are functional in maritime 
safety. To achieve these aims, the synopsis and official findings and analysis of each 
accident will be briefly introduced according to their respective official reports 
(CMSA, 2008; JAIC, 1997) online, subsequently with the corresponding re-analysis 
of the cases from the perspective of the adapted HFACS framework in accordance 
with their flow of event developments, then integrating each contributory factor into 
the framework by its classification. However, in order to fairly treat the official 
analysis on the basis of the same fact, the re-analysis by the new insight attempts to 
shun the introduction of the new evidence from other sources, otherwise possibly 
leading to adverse results. In the end of each case study, short conclusions from 
comparisons between two differing manners will be made available for further 
discussion in the next chapters in relation to the objectives stated in Chapter 1. 
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3.1 Case 1-ESTONIA disaster on 28 September, 1994 
3.1.1 The accident 
The ro-ro passenger ferry ESTONIA under the Estonia flag was operating between 
Tallinn of Estonia, and Stockholm of Sweden. The vessel owned by Estiline 
Maritime Company Limited, however, was virtually operated by its parental 
company, Estonia Shipping Company Limited, which is an Estonia state-owned 
company, and had a maximum carrying capacity of 2000 passengers.  
On the evening of 27 September 1994 at 1915 the ferry left Tallinn with 989 people, 
803 of whom were passengers, for a routine voyage to Stockholm. At the moment 
when the vessel left the sheltered waters, sea conditions along the Estonian coast 
became harsher than before, with a gradually increasing wind to a velocity of 18-20 
m/s and a wave height of approximately 4 m; a sufficient height to flood the car deck. 
The vessel proceeded her route at a full speed of around 15 knots with four engines 
fully running.  
At about 0045 hours the first abnormal metallic sounds were heard by several 
witnesses indicating something was wrong. Nothing was gained from the position of 
the bow visor after the seaman of the watch was instructed to find out what the 
source of the noise was. 15 minutes later, the key part, the bow visor, separated from 
the bow subsequently opening the ramp completely. A great amount of water entered 
the car deck with a high rate due to the full speed against the wind and sea waves, 
rapidly resulting in a heavy starboard list. Due to the unbelievable speed at which the 
tragedy developed there was little chance to prepare a response, with the result that 
many people with inadequate time were trapped in their cabins. Those who 
successfully approached the boat deck jumped overboard or were washed into the sea 
with or without life jackets. No lifeboats could be launched due to the heavy list. 
Shortly after the internal alarm a Mayday call was transmitted at around 0120. All 
four main engines were stopped and the main generators were stopped as well 
afterwards. Furthermore, with the increased water in the vessel, the list was more 
 31
than 90 degrees. The vessel sank rapidly, stern first, and disappeared from the radar 
screens of ships proceeding for assistance in the area at about 0150 hours. As a result, 
137 persons survived from the accident following rescue, while 852 people died.  
3.1.2 Findings of the disaster released by the Joint Accident Investigation 
Commission of Estonia, Sweden and Finland 
The JAIC believed that the cause to the capsizing of the vessel was the detachment of 
the visor, of which the locking device failed to withstand the wave-induced load, 
which lead to a great amount of sea water entering the car deck, following the heavy 
listing and then sinking of the vessel. It was established that the most wanted part of 
the investigation was to find out why the failure of the bow visor happened in this 
case. The maximum withstanding capabilities of the visor against the varied 
wave-induced and wind-induced force with diverse vessel speeds were thereafter 
simulated and calculated in authorized laboratories. It was quantitatively concluded 
that the design load and distribution of the visor on the attachments as installed were 
insufficient to sustain wave-induced impact loads on the night of this accident. 
By observing the recovered visor traced on the seabed some distance from the wreck, 
and recalculating how much load the visor could virtually withstand, the team found 
it short of the designed load of the visor, and that this was the main reason why the 
attachment failed on the night of the disaster. It has been noted that the visor locking 
device was not produced in the light of the design intent, an indication of a scarcity 
of affordable load. The load calculation was only done by the shipyard without the 
involvement of the supervised construction classification, Bureau Veritas, in that no 
such guideline or regulation was in place at that time.  
To make matters worse, the approval of the hull inspection by the Finnish Maritime 
Administration greatly rested on the Classification Society. Instead of itself, the 
Administration did not further examine or inspect the water load of the visor as long 
as it got the certificate from the Classification Society.  
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Besides the failure of the attachment of the visor, the JAIC has concluded some 
contributory factors which attributed to the disaster. Factors like encountering 
prevailing and unacceptable weather conditions, and inadequate attention and 
alertness from both the administration and company sides in response to the exposure 
of deficiencies of the bow visor on similar vessels were also firmly identified in the 
JAIC report. The improper installation of the upper extension of the collision 
bulkhead which did not comply with the requirements of the SOLAS regulations had 
been determined as one of the contributory factors to the disaster. 
Some actions by the crew were also marked as being relevant to the aftermath. At the 
moment of the first signal of unconventionality occurred, the bridge was not aware of 
what happened on board until the heavy list of the vessel was exposed. This 
information was vital and essential in determining the following remedied measures. 
No reduction of speed was therefore taken even after receiving more than two reports 
of abnormal metallic bangs. The efforts to find out information on the source of 
bangs failed. It seems that the crew members neither watched the TV monitor, nor 
asked those in the control room from where the ingress was observed. The most 
effective way to remind crew of the failure of the visor by the position sensors did 
not work, unfortunately. Subsequently, almost no warning message as early as it 
should be, was successfully released or broadcasted to the passengers involved in this 
disaster. Further the Mayday call was transmitted later than supposed. The short time 
available for response made the evacuation and taking courtermeasures meaningless, 
resulting in the chaotic situation faced by the crew and passengers. The Commission 
further asserted that the crew on board were not aware of the visor incident taking 
place on other similar vessels at that time. 
In summary, the JAIC report is a document emphasizing and detailing the technical 
issues which concluded that the accident resulted from the failure of the bow visor. 
This report appears to be in favor of technique failure more than management failure 
in fact, otherwise more people at the blunt end would be blamed for their 
management failure. Most of the failures were analyzed on a surface level, not able 
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to imply how to prevent such failure reoccurring. All the contributory factors in 
relation to the occurrence of the accident as analyzed above are screened in Table 3. 
Cause Description 
Type of error or 
other failure 
Systemic cause or 
preventive action 
Direct cause 
The detachment of the 
ESTONIA's bow visor 
leads amounts of water to 
enter into cardeck, sinking 
the vessel. 
Technical 
failure 
From the analysis, it was 
concluded that this 
failure was due to the 
wave-induced impact 
loads and lack of 
designed load. 
The sea condition that the 
ESTONIA experienced at 
that night was shocking 
and abnormal to the 
vessel itself. 
Meteorological 
condition 
The accurate and timely 
obtaining of weather 
reports could be as a 
source to refer to and 
make the right decision 
and prevent such an 
accident. 
The visor attachments 
were not designed in the 
light of realistic design 
assumptions. 
Design error 
There was no industry or 
regulatory standard at 
that time as a reference 
to set the designed load. 
The master on board had 
a very limited knowledge 
of the potential danger of 
the bow visor closure 
concept. 
Training 
deficiency 
No information on bow 
visor failures was 
systematically and 
intentionally collected, 
warned and disseminated 
within the company and 
its ships. 
Contributory 
causes 
Failure to indicate the Equipment The position sensors of 
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opening bow visor in the 
bridge control panel to 
inform to crew on bridge 
prior to the occurrence. 
failure ramp and bow visor were 
not well designed and 
maintained in good 
manner even though they 
were approved by the 
administration. 
The installation of the 
upper extension of the 
collision bulkhead did not 
comply with the 
requirements of the 
SOLAS regulations. 
Design failure
The Commission 
believes that the 
non-conformity of the 
collision bulkhead has a 
somehow positive effect 
on the entering a mount 
of water the cardeck. 
Table 3 An overview of accident analysis of the ESTONIA according to the JAIC report. 
Source: author. 
3.1.3 Analysis of the case by application of the HFACS framework 
According to what we have learned from the aforementioned discussion of the 
rationality and principle of the adapted HFACS framework, as well as its established 
linkage with the elements of the ISM Code, the proper theory is ready for analyzing 
and recategorizing such complex disaster for the purpose of evaluating the role of 
organizational factors in maritime safety and diagnosing how the adapted HFACS 
framework functions in the maritime context. The basic purpose of such an effort 
here is to search a new insight into mechanisms through which safety is achieved 
through a fresh analysis of such a case from the human error perspective, rather than 
attempting to analyze them by citing the additional sources to criticize the old report.  
Someone may doubt the feasibility of applying the doctrine of the ISM Code to 
justify the organizational role in such case in that the implemented ISM Code was 
not yet in place at the time of ESTONIA. However, the origin of the ISM Code - IMO 
Resolution A.595 (15) called on the need to develop the guidelines on shipboard and 
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shore-based management (UK MCA, 2009) and the discussion in Chapter 2 has 
already implied that the ISM Code is a legal and operational umbrella in the 
maritime field, most of which as analyzed previously stem from operations in the 
course of maritime history, namely common sense or best practices. For instance, in 
the case of the HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE disaster on 6 March 1987, when 
no such ISM Code was in place either, the management factors such as “the absent 
responsibility extended as high as the Board of Director level” (Whittingham, 2004), 
were already throwing light on as the equivalent influential factors at the remote end 
with those factors at the proximal end. In spite of the fact that at the time when the 
accident occurred, the requirement to the management level on its responsibility to 
frontline operation had not yet been available legally, at least in written form, so the 
court still imposed the company’s corresponding responsibility on the management 
level according to its deficient management. It is thereby justified to analyze such a 
case based on the doctrine of the ISM Code. 
Before going into details on the latent conditions which create an environment for the 
sharp end operators to more likely commit unsafe acts, there is a need to clarify what 
an unsafe act is. Equally important is the question which sort of unsafe act is 
involved, error or violation. Surprisingly, the official report appears to be reluctant to 
distinctly disclose any unsafe acts. The report use a great number of chapters to focus 
more on technical details, such as what is the possibility of the bow visor failure and 
why the bow visor failed, but with few words on what is the human operation in 
relation to the failure of the bow visor, without a clear clue on what the unsafe act is. 
Based on recognized details in the official report, there was no unsafe act at the sharp 
end involved in the initial event. The other latent failures have been analyzed as 
follows in accordance with the flow of event developments. 
Firstly, the technical resource support from the company appeared to be inadequate 
for the required maintenance and operations on board.  
Daily experiences suggest that the lack of technical support may greatly result in 
various serious negative aftermaths on board, e.g. deteriorated maintenance 
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operational level. The report has been of the opinion that there were some 
deficiencies found by the trainee PSCOs prior to the accident, nevertheless, no 
further attention was drawn by either the master or the management level on shore. 
Unfortunately, no details on how the management or supervision carefully responded 
to such a fatal deficiency prior to the commencement of this voyage are given. The 
pronounced and tightened conflict between production and the safety has been 
proved conclusively in this case when the master decided to sail for the sake of time 
pressure rather than caring about safety margin despite the absence of rubber 
packings in the visor. With reference to the requirements in the ISM Code, the 
shipping company should ensure adequate resource and shore-based support to the 
ship’s operation and maintenance. The dismayed ignorance of missed or damaged 
rubber packings which assure the watertightness of the external visor gave rise to two 
developments: losing the watertightness of the visor which would allow water to 
enter inside and create a resultant force directed at about 45 degrees forward and 
down, as the official report admitted, and increasing the possibility of vibrating or 
shaking, which further leads to accelerated wear and induces fatigue to the 
connections between the bow visor and shell plates as well as the cleats, hinges and 
bolts. These problems growingly caused the probability of the visor failing to attach 
under harsh weather conditions where the accident took place. Similar maintenance 
operation problems containing damage to the locking devices which reduced the 
strength were observed. In addition, the dysfunction of the signal lamps of the ramp 
and bow visor position sensors, respectively, failing to indicate the state of the ramp 
and bow visor reflected the poor management on board and shore-based. No 
established proper procedure and process supports such maintenance prior to the 
departure. These problems could be categorized as resource support from the shore 
side and process failure in accordance with the Table in Chapter 2.  
Secondly, the non-compliance with the SOLAS regulations regarding the upper 
extension of the collision bulkhead reflects the failure occurred at levels of 
management within the company as well as administrations.  
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As best safety practice, before flagging into Estonia to start the new operation, the 
shipowner should have been sufficiently aware of the essential need to ensure the 
vessel’s condition was in compliance with all relevant international Conventions and 
national law in order to run the vessel on a full international route. In spite of the fact 
that there was no document showing the evidence of exempting the bulkhead from 
the administrations during the construction and the short international operation, due 
to the hesitating attitude of the IMO at that time on whether the requirement should 
be further extended to passenger ships or not, administrations by and large accepted 
the fact without proper collision bulkhead by acquiescence, equally with exemption. 
However, since the 1981 Amendments to SOLAS entered into force in 1984 
specifying the requirement of the collision bulkhead on passenger ships, the new flag 
administration was supposed to follow the requirement. Neither in the course of the 
first inspection by the administration prior to the new traffic in Estonia, nor the 
following two inspections, was any proper remark made to non-compliance with the 
SOLAS regulations regarding the upper extension of the collision bulkhead. As the 
professional and recognized organization on the classification survey, Bureau Veritas 
did not observe any deficiency either in their first survey or annual survey due to the 
scarcity of the bulkhead requirement in the SOLAS Convention. 
Thirdly, remote factors failing at the vessel transferring stage resulted in a sequel of 
the vessel’s capsizing with regard to certificate management.  
As the report revealed, the original safety navigation certificate, which is sufficient to 
meet the initial route issued by the Finnish Maritime Administration, was only 
intended for the short international voyage sailing within 200 nm between two ports. 
The reasons why the authority issued the short international voyage were not 
recovered in detail, but surely based on the actual operating voyage in terms of the 
meteorological conditions and distance. Therefore, including the upper extension of 
the collision bulkhead, several requirements to such a vessel in the operation of such 
voyage were exempted by the Finnish Authority. Both the new company 
management and administration were not aware of the need to fully assess the 
feasibility of the vessel to run in a tougher meteorological condition and longer 
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voyage than the previous one so that actually the vessel was running over a voyage 
area out of its reach. Such a symbolic governmental job was utterly authorized to 
Classification Society - Bureau Veritas - the same one as under the Finnish flag. 
Based on an agreement between Bureau Veritas and the company it was merely 
arranged for certain items not covered by the conventions to be taken care of, for 
instance, the drawing plan was not scrutinized, rather than a full survey. In spite of 
the fact that there may have been some uncovered truth behind the agreement, one 
thing is sure here and that is the lack of any effective certificate management from 
the company management perspective. 
Fourthly, the company was not mindful of a potential hazard on board which had 
been warned by a series of similar serious incidents occurring in maritime industry.  
Despite the absence of a legal requirement risk assessment for the time, the 
frequently occurred incidents associated with the failure of the bow visor should 
have reminded the management level to notice its seriousness of the hazard. To be an 
informative and responsible company, onshore management should have collected, 
analyzed and distributed the intensive occurred accidents related to such analogical 
passenger ship’ safety, and educated their crew on board to enhance safety awareness. 
The company satisfied itself with the proud reason that the bow visor of the 
ESTONIA was the latest and biggest design at the time of construction. In addition, it 
has been noted that the master and crew, who were limited to access such 
information based on the limited resources on board, lacked knowledge and 
awareness on the hazard of the bow visor; otherwise they could have noticed soon 
the source of bang sound and take necessary countermeasures. The occurrence of 
numerous incidents analyzed in the official report had already given the evidence 
that the timely observation of the failure or part - failure was rather conducive to 
minimize the consequence of the incidents. As a matter of fact, most vessels involved 
in the cases occurring successfully recovered from the risk of disaster by reducing 
the speed or stopping the voyage. In the statistics of the cases it was stated in the 
official report, that most cases (12 out 14) were triggered by the heavy weather and 
waves. Likewise, if the management had been sufficiently mindful of the negative 
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effect of the heavy weather to underpin the safety margin by authorizing the master 
with the freedom of navigation decision-making in terms of time pressure, this case 
would have had the biggest probability to be eradicated or at least mitigated. 
However, for the company, it is a failure that the potential hazard of the bow visor 
finally resulted in such disaster. 
On the one hand, no extensive research by the industry was made to find out the 
common reasons in such incidents and enhance the safety standard in the related 
regulations with regard to the failure of the bow visor. The affected administrations 
and classification societies, involving major ones, were satisfied with the fact that the 
strengthened requirements to the affected vessels were enhanced, and such new 
requirements were only applied to new constructions. The ESTONIA heavily slapped 
the industry with a disaster for the compromised result between the administrations 
and industry that the new requirement was not applicable to existing vessels, 
including the ESTONIA. Unfortunately, these unacceptable attitudes are still 
prevailing nowadays for the reason of the mount of costs arising from the 
implementation of the new legislation on existing vessels. 
Last but not least, looking back to the design stage of construction, there were no 
legal standards or requirements for the bow visor loads at the national level which 
made the role of classification and administration in monitoring the bow visor design 
and production voluntary. The official report claimed that the shortage of the 
designed load led to the failed resistance against the wave-induced impact. Again, 
this suggested the industrial legislation or standard development was lagging behind 
technical innovation. 
To sum up, there is no unsafe act, but with the named active failure involved in this 
case, where a number of latent failures constitutes those causation events in the 
course of accident development from the blunt ends which were creating the 
deteriorated surroundings for the sharp end to be more likely to suffer the aftermath 
of poor management. The whole new picture of the analyzed brief causation graph in 
the adapted HFACS framework is described in Table 4.  
 1st Tier 2nd Tier 3rd Tier ESTONIA Causation 
Statutory 
? International/national 
standards 
? Administration 
Implementation/enforcement 
★Absence of national law on standardizing 
the exemption and scrutinizing the hull 
survey. 
★Vacuum role of administration on hull 
survey for flag changing.  
★ Lagged law reaction to restrict the 
frequently and similarly occurred accidents.
★Absence of standards and requirements 
on bow visor design 
Social Environment 
influences 
External 
environment 
? Meteorological factors 
? Political/economic factors 
? Navigation aids/conditions 
★ Encountering the exceptional 
meteorological condition. 
       Latent C
onditions 
Organizational 
Influences Resources 
? Definition of responsibility, authority 
and interrelation of related personnel 
? Adequate resource and shore-based 
support 
? Designed persons 
? Authority of the master 
? Qualification of the master 
? Seafarers’ qualification 
★Inadequate shore-based resource support 
to board maintenance and operations. 
    R
em
ote from
 the ship 
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? Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules
? Training requirements 
? Linguistic requirements to seafarers 
? Effective communication capability of 
personnel 
? Statutory maintenance support 
? Updated and available documentation 
Organizational 
climate 
? Statement of company’s policy 
? Implementation and maintenance of 
policy 
? Report its responsible company to 
authority 
? Definition of responsibility, authority 
and interrelation of related personnel 
? Designated persons 
? Responsibility of the master 
? Authority of the master 
★Failure to collect, analyze and distribute 
similar accidents. 
 
Organizational 
Process 
? Qualification of the master 
? Seafarers’ qualification 
? Process of the new assignments 
? Training requirements 
? Plans for shipboard operations 
? Identification of potential threats 
? Drill and exercises 
? Measures to respond the hazard and 
accidents 
? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Implementation of corrective action 
? Statutory maintenance 
? Routine inspections 
? Procedure to control documentation and 
data 
★Failure to manage the deficiency in the 
certificate in terms of short voyage. 
★Failure to respond the deficiency found 
prior to the commencement of the voyage. 
★Failure to maintain the bow visor in 
proper condition. 
★Failure to identify the non-compliance 
with the SOLAS regulations regarding the 
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? Effective control of documentation 
? Company verification, review and 
evaluation 
upper extension of the collision bulkhead. 
★Shortage to identify the potential hazard 
on board with reference to the bow visor. 
★Shortage of training the crew over the 
bow visor management. 
Inadequate 
supervision 
? Designated persons 
? Responsibility of the master 
? Procedure of new assignments 
 
Planned in 
appropriate 
operations 
? Training requirements 
? Linguistic requirements to 
seafarers 
? Effective communication 
capability of personnel 
? Plans for shipboard operations 
? Identification of potential threats. 
? Drill and exercise 
? Measures to respond the hazard 
and accidents 
? Statutory maintenance 
? Routine inspections 
? Specific actions to the system 
failures 
? Routine maintenance and test 
★Failure to maintain the visor and ramp 
position indicator in order. 
★Failure to maintain the locking device in 
order. 
★Shortage of training the crew over the 
bow visor management. 
Unsafe supervision/ 
workplace factors 
Failed to correct 
known problems 
? Measures to respond the hazard 
and accidents 
? Non-conformities and accident 
report 
★Failure to correct the absence of rubble 
packings. 
? Implementation of corrective 
action 
Supervisory 
violations 
? Non-conformities and accident 
report 
? Company verification, review and 
evaluation 
 
Environmental 
factors 
? Physical 
? Technical ★Running out of its original certificated 
voyage area. 
★Deficiencies in the bow visor regarding 
the inadequacy of design. 
Condition of crew 
members 
? Cognitive factors 
? Physiological state  
Preconditions for 
unsafe acts 
Personal factors ? Crew interaction ? Personal readiness  
Error 
? Skill-based errors 
? Decision and judgment errors 
? Perceptual errors 
 
Unsafe acts 
Violation ? Routine ? Exceptional  
Proxim
ity to the ship
Table 4 An overview of analyzing ESTOINA disaster by the adapted HFACS framework. 
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Source: Author.
A
ctive failures
 
3.1.4 Outcomes of the comparison between the original findings by JAIC and 
further analysis by HFACS 
Since the final JAIC report represents only a summary and therefore does not mean 
first hand statements or materials, it should be born in mind that this ultimately 
affects the accuracy of the result of the re-analysis of the accident report. Some 
information necessary for re-analysis in the framework may not be available or 
accessible. The interpretations or assumptions made are therefore only based on the 
refined materials from the official report, and may not be as exact as those stemming 
from the raw material. Furthermore, without the mandatory ISM Code in place at that 
time, there was no legal responsibility for the company to be in compliance with it. 
Anything assumed in the above section is based on the philosophy of the ISM Code. 
However, those limitations do not impede the purpose of the re-analysis of this case, 
which is to test as to whether the adapted framework is proper to apply in the specific 
case, not to refer to evaluate as to whether the result is right or not. Thus, based on 
the above limited assumptions, some short findings are observed from the 
comparison between the original report and the re-analysis: 
1. More latent or remote factors on the environment to create the possibility of 
such an accident have come clear from the re-analysis. If we could code a 
certain value into each factor, according to the approach similarly done by 
Brown and Haugen (1998), we could then evaluate the influential proportion of 
each factor in this case.  
2. Since the latent or remote factors were clearly presented and structured in the 
framework, recommendations generated from such a way make more sense and 
directive. 
3. Even though there is no unsafe act at the sharp end, the latent organizational 
factors are still greatly influential in the safety performance on board.  
4. The statutory requirement in place is vital to guarantee the active role of the 
organization in ensuring maritime safety. 
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5. The selections of the initial event and stop event from the new insight appear to 
be better and more reasonable than those from the traditional one. 
3.2 Case 2-QINFENG 128 accident on 27 March, 2008 
3.2.1 The accident 
The multiple-purpose cargo vessel QINFENG 128, under the Chinese flag with 7122 
GT, called at Ningbo, China via the southern fairway of Jintang Island from Tianjing, 
a northern port mainly for exporting coal from the mines in China. During the period 
of anchorage, when waiting for the berthing order, the exchange of crew, including a 
new master, took place on board according to the shipowner’s crew exchange order.  
Two days later at 0025 on 27 March, when the vessel had completely unloaded all 
coal, it unmoored and sailed to Tianjing again to loading coal via a short cut route; 
the eastern fairway of the Jintang Island, where a new bridge, namely the Jintang 
Great Bridge, with a length of approximate 18km over the sea, had been constructed 
since 2005. At this stage of bridge construction, non-construction-related vessels 
were not allowed to pass through any bridge spans aside from the central 
navigational bridge span and western side navigational bridge span next to the 
central bridge span, which had already been put into use for a few months. 
Unfortunately, the vessel decided to sail with a velocity of 14 knots against the wind 
through the western side bridge non-navigation span as it was planned, where the 
new concrete bridge box girders had just been put across the supporting piers a 
couple of days earlier, and had not yet been fixed permanently. Even with very good 
visibility that night, the fore mast, conning bridge and Radar mast of QINFENG 128 
subsequently crashed into two pending concrete bridge box girders between the 
No.E19-E20 supporting piers.  
Finally, two pending concrete bridge box girders over the supporting piers fell down, 
collapsing the fore mast, the conning bridge and Radar mast of the QINFENG 128 
and then landed on the compass deck of the vessel with the consequence that four 
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crew on the bridge died, including the new master, chief officer, second officer and a 
wheel man, and the vessel grounded. The fallen bridge box girders broke into several 
pieces but were still connected by the reinforcing steel bar inside the box girders and 
some damage was caused to the span bridge supports as well. 
3.2.2 Findings of the disaster released by the official investigatory report 
It has been learned that in order to ensure the safety of the bridge - the constructed 
operation, the Navigation Order prohibited any non-related vessels to sail within a 
700 m area of the bridge operation on each side. 14 pairs of warning light-buoys in 
good condition were set up on both sides of the operation areas. In addition, 7 pairs 
of navigation light-buoys were set up on the way to two navigation bridge apertures.  
With reference to this Navigation Order, the official report has established that the 
direct cause of the accident was the vessel’s violation, no mater intentionally or 
unintentionally, to sail through the bridge - constructed operational water area, 
non-navigational bridge span between No.E19-E20 supporting piers. This conclusion 
was evidenced by its navigation track of the vessel history prior to the collision with 
the bridge as recorded by the company’s navigation track system.  
The natural question in connection with exploring the cause of this accident is why 
they decided to choose the short cut fairway rather than the fairway from which the 
vessel approached to the port. Due to the fact that all the duty crew, including the 
master and second mate, died, no certain answer can be given in response to such a 
question-why they violated the Navigation Order to go through the prohibited, 
narrow and shallow water area rather than that allowed, wide and deep water area. 
However, two possibilities with regard to explanations to such questions were 
attempted to be established. 
Firstly, the crew members, especially the master, had not been informed by the 
message that the concrete bridge box girders had already been put there, nor did the 
duty crew notice the concrete bridge box girders, with a negligent lookout, even 
under good visibility at that night. The master had just joined the ship, and a few 
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days earlier the concrete bridge box girders had just stood there. There was no 
evidence that the master noticed such information. 
Secondly, the estimation of the net height of the bridge span above the water was 
insufficient for the requirement of actual height, providing that the master knew the 
fact that two pending concrete bridge box girders were there. According to the local 
meteorological report on the tide information, a calculation was made of the net 
height of the bridge span above the water, which was less than 15.1m considering the 
tide effect. Under the condition of idle load, the top point of the fore mast was more 
than 22m, while that of the Radar mast was more than 21.8m. As a result, the clear 
height of the bridge span was insufficient to pass under such a low draft and an over 
height vessel.  
In searching the chart the vessel applied in this voyage, the absence of a chart small 
correction was believed to be a significant contributory factor to the occurrence of 
the violation, and the accident. Even though every Notices to Mariners, including 
that concerning the information of setting up the navigation prohibited zone 
especially for a bridge construction, from the chart station being timely distributed to 
the vessels, no mark about the chart small correction was found on the chart in the 
spot area. On the chart, the planned route had been drawn, as it actually went through, 
to pass through that prohibited water area, deviating 1 nm far away from the western 
side of the navigational bridge span. Conclusively, the second mate drew the planned 
route on the basis of shortage of chart small correction.  
In summary, no matter if the master approved the planned route in advance or not, 
this is a case where the master should be responsible for the negligence of his duty to 
ensure the safety of this ship. The whole picture of the analyzed causes to this case is 
drawn in the Table 5 as shown below:  
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Causes Description Type of error or other failure
Systemic cause or preventive 
action 
Direct 
Cause 
Crew’s violation to pass 
through the prohibited 
navigational water area. 
Violation 
The crew on duty should always 
maintain with full due care on 
the safety information, so that 
the master can determine 
informatively the right sailing 
route without negligent 
violation. 
The absence of a small 
correction on the chart on the 
information of prohibited 
navigational water area. 
Violation 
The master should supervise the 
responsible mate to make the 
chart timely informative with 
small correction. 
Wrongly planned route for 
navigation to Tianjing port Planned 
error 
When making the planned route, 
the responsible mate should refer 
to all relevant safety information 
to ensure the safety on route. 
Overestimation of the safety 
margin of the net height 
above the water area across 
the aperture. 
Skill-based 
error 
When passing the bridge span 
and estimating the height of the 
vessel, the tide and draft should 
often be taken into account. 
Contributory 
Causes 
Negligent lookout of the 
duty crew who did not 
observe the bridge 
contributed to the occurrence 
of the accident. 
Violation 
The proper lookout is needed to 
be maintained in all 
circumstances on board, 
whenever the master is on board 
or not. 
Table 5 An overview of the cause analysis of QINFENG 128 according to its official report. 
Source: Author. 
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3.2.3 Analysis of the case by application of the adapted HFACS framework 
From the perspective of the human error causation framework as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the application of the adapted HFACS model is described in the way that 
highlights the latent failures, based on the unveiled details in the official report.  
By its very nature, the feasibility of the application of the adapted HFACS 
framework with reference to the ISM Code to this case seems to be appropriate. The 
ship’s responsibility to implement the ISM Code since 2005 has been delegated and 
contracted to the shipping company which is a specialized shipping management 
company with dozens of non-itself-owned ships from diverse shipowners, which 
provides the foundation of applying the doctrine of the ISM Code in this case. 
Referring to its shipping manager independent from the shipowner, the need to 
introduce some background of the management is necessary to better understand the 
latent failures. 
A couple of months prior to the accident, the shipowner of the QINFENG 128 signed 
a sales contract with a view that the new shipowner took over the full responsibility 
of its management half a month before the accident, however, without notifying its 
shipping company. In accordance with the supplemented contract signed later, the 
registration change of the vessel would not be applied until the final payment, half of 
which had already been transacted successfully, being completed. Thereby, instead 
of its shipping company, the new shipowner virtually took control of the vessel since 
the contract had been signed, but with no change of its registration prior to the 
accident.  
In knowing the confused organizational responsibilities, we now could throw light on 
several developments from latent failures to active failures. Compared to the first 
case analyzed above, this case would be comparatively simple structured in failure 
event flows. Undebatably, the duty mate and master should be blamed for their 
violation of approaching the prohibited navigational water area, which is of course 
the unsafe act, and the improper lookout before the collision so that the crew had 
insufficient time to take the proper measures of prevention, in the adapted HFACS 
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framework. The remote failures in this case were analyzed by its developments of 
event flow as follows.  
First of all, as an elementary source of essential navigation information, no document 
on board is more significant than the chart and its publications in the aspect of 
ensuring safe navigation. The obtained evidence of the chart used in this voyage 
suggests that the chart management was in a mess on board. The official Navigation 
Order of setting up the prohibited navigational water area was issued in 2007, and its 
chart information was subsequently broadcasted via the Coastal Radio System as 
well as published in the latest Notice to Mariner. In the light of its implemented 
documents of the SMS, the second mate is specifically responsible for the chart 
management, while the master, at the top management level on board, has the overall 
responsibility of such management. Until the accident happened, no information, 
even with the projection of bridge construction which was initiated in 2005, was 
marked on the concerned chart in terms of chart small correction.  
The mentioned mess corporation between the shipowner and shipping company fully 
reflects the insufficient and inconsistent support of the implementation of ISM Code, 
by the shipowner, who discouraged the shipping company to exercise its obligations 
to monitor the vessel’s performance. In the first quarter of 2008 prior to the accident, 
the vessel was not boarded and inspected by the shipping company. In accordance 
with its ISM documents, certain inspections by the shipping company should have 
been exercised on board at a given interval.  
More surprisingly, even in the company’s safety operation room, the chart used in 
this voyage which should have contained the bridge construction information was not 
maintained at the updated level either. It was equipped with a live voyage tracking 
system with a non-updated digital chart, but no warning information was being sent 
to its vessel prior to the collision. It conveys an explicit message that the chart small 
correction was not a compelling concern from the company’s perspective. 
During the flag state inspection on board in November 2007, the competent authority 
issued a report concerning such deficiencies, but with a disappointed consequence 
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that no one really took care of this issue in their hearts. Thereby, whoever at the 
proximal or remote side, both sides maintained the safety operation with regard to 
chart management at an improper level, ultimately leading to the occurrence of the 
collision. 
In addition, the qualification of the master should be doubted in terms of sufficient 
proficiency to exercise his job. The inquiry record of the shipping company signaled 
that another master recommended by the shipowner failed to pass the examination by 
the shipping company a couple of months earlier. Neither the process of employment 
of the new master involved in this accident, together with two other ordinary crew 
members, nor its interview and examination according to its SMS documentation, 
was conducted by or even notified to the shipping company. The non-involvement of 
the crew employment of the shipping company with regard to the requirement of the 
ISM Code constitutes the evidence of non-conformity at its organizational level. It 
has been widely agreed that a competent master should have been aware of the 
elementary role of the updated chart in safety navigation on board. The new master 
in question failed to emphasize but succeeded in proving the importance of the role 
of the updated chart by showing his experience. 
Furthermore, by its job description, the master was supposed to scrutinize and 
approve the planned route that the second mate had made under the direction of his 
best professional judgement and credible informative sources. Because of his 
competency was in question and insufficient attention on the validity of the chart, the 
planned route, as the vessel actually sailed, was believed not to have been scrutinized, 
at least in an acceptable manner.  
With reference to the preconditions for unsafe acts, no information written on the 
official report intimated that there was something wrong on board concerning the 
psychologically technical shortage due to the fact that all four of the seafarers 
involved died during the accident. It was technically and objectively difficult to 
determine what was wrong in this respect.  
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Theoretically speaking, an analysis of any collision case should be made by both 
sides with a view to diagnosing what failures had taken place on each side. To give a 
simple example, if the regulation have been set up to demand one more barrier to be 
established, e.g. special navigation monitoring system within the bridge water area, 
such an accident could have been prevented from occurring by warning and 
informing the crew prior to its collision. However, the adapted HFACS framework 
appears to be incapable of dealing with more than one part involved in the same 
incident, otherwise being in a mess condition so that the incident developments 
involved would not be recognized in a comfortable way. 
In summary, the cause of the collision between the QINFENG 128 and the bridge 
span appears to be an exceptional violation, transferring through the prohibited 
navigational water area, by the scarcity of a valid and updated informative chart due 
to the improper safety management at both the ship and onshore levels, and the 
inappropriate lookout on board. The entire view of the causation analysis from the 
adapted HFACS framework point of view is analyzed and presented in Table 6 as 
follows. 
 
1st Tier 2nd Tier 3rd Tier QINFENG 128 case causation 
Statutory 
? International/national standards 
? Administration 
Implementation/enforcement 
 
Social Environment 
influences 
External 
environment 
? Meteorological factors 
? Political/economic factors 
? Navigation aids/conditions 
★Constructing bridge barrier cross on 
the voyage. 
Resources 
? Definition of responsibility, authority and 
interrelation of related personnel 
? Adequate resource and shore-based support
? Designed persons 
? Authority of the master 
? Qualification of the master 
? Seafarers’ qualification 
? Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules 
? Training requirements 
? Linguistic requirements to seafarers 
? Effective communication capability of 
personnel 
? Statutory maintenance support 
? Updated and available documentation 
★Failure to manage the employment of 
master in a proper procedure. 
Organizational 
climate 
? Statement of company’s policy 
? Implementation and maintenance of policy
? Report its responsible company to authority
? Definition of responsibility, authority and 
interrelation of related personnel 
? Designated persons 
? Responsibility of the master 
? Authority of the master 
★Insufficient and inconsistent support 
from the shipowner to the shipping 
company. 
      Latent C
onditions 
Organizational 
Influences 
Organizational 
Process 
? Qualification of the master 
? Seafarers’ qualification 
? Process of the new assignments 
★Failure to supervise the ship safety 
operation in relation to the chart small 
      R
em
ote from
 the ship                                                         
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? Training requirements 
? Plans for shipboard operations 
? Identification of potential threats 
? Drill and exercises 
? Measures to respond the hazard and 
accidents 
? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Implementation of corrective action 
? Statutory maintenance 
? Routine inspections 
? Procedure to control documentation and 
data 
? Effective control of documentation 
? Company verification, review and 
evaluation 
correction. 
★Failure to monitor the ship’s voyage 
on board. 
Failure to execute its inspection on 
board. 
Inadequate 
supervision 
? Designated persons 
? Responsibility of the master 
? Procedure of new assignments 
★Failure to approve the planned route 
in proper manner. 
Failure to supervise the chart small 
correction from both ship and onshore 
side. 
Unsafe supervision/ 
workplace factors 
Planned in 
appropriate 
operations 
? Training requirements 
? Linguistic requirements to seafarers 
? Effective communication capability of 
personnel 
? Plans for shipboard operations 
? Identification of potential threats. 
? Drill and exercise 
? Measures to respond the hazard and 
accidents 
? Statutory maintenance 
? Routine inspections 
? Specific actions to the system failures 
? Routine maintenance and test 
★Failure to make a safe planned route. 
Failure to manage chart in a proper 
way. 
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Failed to correct 
known problems 
? Measures to respond the hazard and 
accidents 
? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Implementation of corrective action 
★ Failure to correct the defects in 
connection with the chart small 
correction reported by the 
Administration Officer. 
Supervisory 
violations 
? Non-conformities and accident report 
? Company verification, review and 
evaluation 
★Violation to not maintain the chart in 
updated level. 
Environment ? Physical ? Technical  
Condition of crew 
members 
? Cognitive factors 
? Physiological state  
Preconditions for unsafe 
acts 
Personal ? Crew interaction ? Personal readiness  
Error 
? Skill-based errors 
? Decision and judgment errors 
? Perceptual errors 
 
Unsafe acts 
Violation 
? Routine 
? Exceptional ★ Violation to sail through the 
prohibited navigational water area- 
bridge constructed water area.  
★ Failure to maintain the proper 
lookout on board. 
A
ctive failures
Proxim
ity to the ship
Table 6 An overview of the causation in the case of the QINGFENG 128 by application of the adapted HFACS framework. 
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Source: Author.
 
3.2.4 Outcomes of the comparison between the official report and further 
analysis using the adapted HFACS model 
After all, the official accident report is a report with refined material in consideration 
of its validity and authenticity which may not be verified in a proper way. In this 
respect, without precise first-hand material from the investigation, the accuracy of 
the re-analysis result cannot be guaranteed. There may have been a possibility of 
deviation from the truth. Nevertheless, these negative elements cannot impair our 
findings from the comparison in terms of its manner of application manner because 
our focus on the way of how we analyze the accident from the new insight 
perspective: 
1. Effective organizational implementation and support plays a crucial role in the 
improvement of safety performance on board. 
2. Organizational factors were in a dynamic state, meaning that they may trigger 
the onset of accidents or unexpected incidents under certain conditions. 
3. There may have more than one unsafe act involved in one case. 
4. If more than one part is involved in the case, oversimplification will appear to 
be shakier. 
5. In contrast to the official analysis manner, the new manner by application of the 
adapted HFACS framework appears much more guided on how to make the 
precautions.  
6. The new model guided the investigator to lock the reasonable initiating event 
and stop event in the course of maritime investigations. 
7. With the benefits of classified and structured categories in the framework, it is 
conducive to streamline the data collection from the investigation. 
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 Chapter 4 Verification of the adapted HFACS 
Framework 
 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, one of the primary tasks of this study is to aim at verifying the 
feasibility of the adapted HFACS framework applied in specific maritime cases. The 
result of this verification during the application in Chapter 3 appears to be positive. 
The benefits from the usage of an accident model have justified its validity in the 
maritime field. It is a useful tool in determining what we are going to look for and 
resolve. This has been concluded in Chapter 3 and will be discussed partly in Chapter 
4 that, by means of the adapted HFACS tool, it guides the analysis of accidents into 
deeper and more fundamental causal levels - in particular the organizational factors, 
which are the most influential elements in the system and heightened in an 
outstanding position. In addition, the applied model contributes to make clear how 
the organizational factors affect the system’s safety and how much the organizational 
factors contribute to system’s safety. By tracing its pathway to the failures of those 
factors, eventually the effective and functional measures to prevent the onset of 
maritime accidents at certain organizational levels may be developed in a proper way. 
So as to decide the validity of such a framework in the maritime industry, besides 
what is generally stated above, we still have to look into the details of two aspects, cf. 
the three standards stated in Chapter 2, as follows. 
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4.1 Comprehensiveness of the data collection of the adapted HFACS 
framework 
Leveson (2004) once argued that the most effective causation models we need are 
supposed to go beyond portioning liability and instead promote investigators to gain 
learning from the accidents as much as possible about all the possible factors 
involved, including but not limited to those related to organizational structures and 
influencing the accident. The need of such effective causation models in the maritime 
domain is also argued for in this study. 
In Chapter 3, it has been learned that using the adapted HFACS framework can 
accommodate and explore a substantial number of contributory factors by the distinct 
classification of those factors. 16 sorts of factors in case 1 while 12 factors in case 2, 
on the basis of two official reports, were analyzed using the new insight. The 
practical application has proved that none of the possible factors disclosed in the 
official reports has fallen outside the HFACS classification and framework. Even the 
dynamic and unpredicted weather condition as the external factor, in case 1, has been 
integrated in that model. In particular, the functions of the organizational factors in 
the framework are proved to be apparent due to their origin under the prevailing ISM 
Code. However, the factors in the adapted HFACS framework, which were not 
presented in Chapter 3, are still in need of more practice and application in the 
foreseeable future.  
The experience in such applications suggests that the well-sorted and -structured 
failure categories in the HFACS framework are applicable in the analysis of 
maritime accidents, at least in the discussed instances. With the well-sorted 
categories of failures, investigators are capable of placing the pre-analyzed failures in 
proper positions within the framework according to their nature. Some benefits may 
be gained from such well sorted categories; including the accident analysis report in 
more strategically structured form and the more distinct factors explored and 
classified by such well-sorting. Later on the statistics and analysis of a group of such 
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reports can be well managed because of their uniform structure and factor 
classifications. Looking back on the application of the adapted HFACS framework in 
cases, it looks as if the organizational factors were heightened in a certain manner. 
The around reverse-Pyramid-structure of the adapted HFACS framework per se has 
intimated its propensity in the organizational factors, an indication that the 
investigators are guided to do something with regard to the organizational factors 
under the guidance of the model. If investigators ask themselves more questions 
similar to what rationality is behind the preconditions of unsafe acts, the 
disappointing situation identified by Schröder, Baldauf and Ghirxi’s work (2009) 
where 73% of precondition of unsafe acts accounted for the fire accident in 
machinery space in comparison to 30% of unsafe supervision/workplace factors, 
could be shunned. Particular similarity of such a model is the argument of 
Rasmussen (1997) that the investigators have to consider that as a compelling 
accident causation model, it requires emphasis in explaining the factors that shape 
human error, rather than focusing on the frontline operator who commits unsafe acts. 
In addition, by its classification structure, the adapted tool appears to combat its 
comprehensive data involved by ensuring the “consistency, objectivity and 
transparency of the data collection and analysis processes” (Reinach & Viale, 2006). 
In spite of the fact that more studies and practices are needed to prove its 
applicability in maritime accident investigation practice, the adapted HFACS 
framework, at least in this study, has illustrated that its taxonomies were capable of 
capturing all collected contributory factors available and its propensity of well-sorted 
category may enhance maritime investigation and analysis. 
4.2 Depth and reliability of analysis using the adapted HFACS 
framework 
Despite the origin of the adapted HFACS framework - Reason’s model, which is a 
sort of epidemiological model argued by Hollnagel (2004), the experience of its 
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application implies that the adapted HFACS framework can be viewed as a kind of 
system model, as agreed by Reason (2008) in his article. The merits of the 
framework in its application, inter alia, its nature of accommodation of all the factors 
stated above, the functional interactions between each factor discussed in Chapter 4, 
its capability of dealing with environmental disturbances, and its applicability to 
maritime cases, can justify the nature of the systemic model, in comparison to all the 
features from the example of the systemic model described by Leveson (2004).  
The need of the systemic models in the maritime field has also been proved 
conclusively to be necessary. The systemic nature of such a model shows its depth, 
credibility and comprehensiveness of analysis in maritime accident investigations. 
The applied experience has evidenced that, notwithstanding, the depth of its analysis 
by the framework would be contingent closely to the extent which the investigatory 
information released by the cited official reports. There are two aspects affecting 
how much the accident details will disclose: subjectivity and objectivity.  
? Subjectivity refers to the willingness of the investigator to release the 
information in avoidance of publicity challenge on his/her result. Rather than 
releasing more information which may mislead publicity to doubt its ability of 
clarifying its explanatory report, he/her prefers to focus on the responsibility of 
frontline operators, a kind of popularity favored by the authority which may 
exclude a good deal of trouble.  
? Objectivity could be interpreted as the investigators’ objective impossibility in 
obtaining the necessary information, such as the geographic separation between 
the shipowner and shipping company often makes the investigators incapable of 
accessing information unless the authority is willing to invest a lot in its 
investigations. The more information the report discloses, the deeper and more 
latent factors in the analysis by the new model could be approached.  
Moreover, the application of such an adapted HFACS framework makes good the 
advantage of shunning the answer of what is the root cause, which is the best suitable 
for analyzing assumed simple linear causation accidents that is not a systemic view 
 61
and needs intensive time and cost investment to clarify (ABS Consulting, 2005; 
Hollnagel, 2009, p.105) and has two more limitations in its application as claimed by 
Ferjencik (2010), but with a pragmatic focus on producing workable and effective 
corrective measures at all levels of organization to prevent the occurrence. In contrast, 
it looks like a complete treatment not only resolves the symptoms on the surface but 
also eliminates the underlying disease that causes it. The motivation to formulate an 
explanation by using this framework is more pragmatic than the root cause, in a 
sense that it well addresses the compelling concern of how to prevent the accident 
from reoccurring.  
More importantly, “various weaknesses” (Wreathall, 2006) suffered from several 
currently used techniques of accident analysis can be addressed by the 
comprehensive structure of the adapted HFACS framework. Firstly, as discussed in 
4.1, the structured data sufficiently captures all the present collected data covering a 
variety from technical process to social process. Secondly, the developed framework 
greatly focuses on the role of the organizational factors which is discussed in next 
chapter, not simply relying on partially recalled knowledge of events by the seafarers 
concerned. Thirdly, this framework describing the control of safety by intangible 
safety control flow and tangible well-sorted and -organized structure emphasizes the 
couplings between each factor, as if there was no connection, which are further 
demonstrated in 5.2. 
On the other hand, the perfect application of the “stop rule” (Rasmussen, 1988; 
Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007; Hollnagel, 2009, p.11) - “keep investigating until a 
familiar cause is found to which the cure is known” - in the adapted HFACS 
framework rightly reflects the selection of the initiating event and end event in the 
structure of the framework itself. Actually, the structured and classified HFACS 
framework provides a pragmatic guidance in selection of both an initiating point 
traditionally at its sharp end and a stopping point normally at its organizational level 
or social environment level in an effort to trace back the event. In the traditional 
manner in our cases, the first and final event in the chain of events is often not fixed, 
varying from case to case and subject to the investigators’ preference. The 
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investigators’ subjectivity in the selection of an initiating and stopping point leads to 
a quite diverse analysis outcome from the accident investigation. In addition, it may 
be due to the diversified assumptions implied by the causation models that were used, 
known as What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find or WYLFIWYF principle 
(Hollnagel, 2009, p.85). A typical example can be referred to the case of BP’s Texas 
City refinery in Hollnagel’s work. 
Why is this matter so important for the outcome of the investigation? Two concerns 
should be referred to in order to answer such a question: to assign liability for the 
accident and to understand how to prevent the reoccurrence. The former is quite 
relevant to the administrative investigation, whose main responsibility is perhaps to 
portion the blame and penalize the responsible persons. Some criticisms arise in 
response to such an approach for its allocation of blame. A typical one is Dekker (as 
cited in Ghirxi, 2008) who criticized as the error classification systems which just 
shift the blame up to the organizational level rather than blaming the frontline 
operators. In respect of the blame culture, it is a fact that the more failures that are 
observed at the organizational level, the more corresponding liability will be 
assigned on them. However, the question is why we have to stick ourselves in the 
domain of the blame culture. If so, the management level will be motivated by such 
to invest more resources in building safety; if so, the mere result of investigation is to 
blame the people in operation, no matter which approach is considered. Rather than 
the former one, it is more meaningful to see the benefits from the second point of 
view - to know how to prevent a reoccurrence. The selection of the initiating and 
stopping point provides us with a better and more thorough way to systemically 
review the entire organization at enough depth, to cover all the possibilities of 
workable measures of prevention ranging from the top management to the frontline 
operators, from social process to technical process. All the factors which may affect 
the stability of the system are possible to accept the systemic assessment. 
By looking into the details of its application, the applicability of the adapted HFACS 
framework in specific maritime cases is sufficiently reflected in two aspects as 
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discussed above. It has been learned that the adapted HFACS framework provides us 
with a far more adequate and thorough structure and classifications than actually 
needed. In theory, by its established connection with the ISM Code and the 
generality of elements in the ISM Code in terms of the organizational factors, its 
applicability will be extended positively to other sorts of accidents in maritime 
accident investigation practice. On the other hand, its kindred with the Reason’s 
model provides the credibility of the adapted HFACS framework while its depth of 
analysis by the new framework tightly relies on the thorough review of contributory 
factors in the framework, which has been proved to be positive previously. The 
conclusion is made, therefore, that the adapted HFACS framework is effective in 
maritime accident investigations. 
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 Chapter 5 Findings and discussions 
 
Since the verification of the adapted HFACS framework has been established in the 
previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter on the organizational factors becomes 
more convincing and comfortable in terms of its validity. In contrast to the traditional 
manner used by the authorities, the obvious issue we can see is that the adapted 
HFACS framework provides investigators with a comprehensive view for 
remarkably exploring and classifying not only the human factors, but also some other 
factors identified in the course of the analysis of accidents, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
In analyzing human error in the cases, the organizational factors have been 
highlighted by pinpointing the fundamental positions of the organizational factors in 
the system and providing insight about why accidents occur. The following section 
focuses on discussing some findings in Chapter 3 in relation to the outcomes 
compared between the traditional manner and the new insight. 
5.1 More functional barriers towards the organizational levels 
become available 
The new insight, from the HFACS point of view, into the analysis of the causation 
provides a brand new view into the causation of an accident, which constitutes how 
the accident develops, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. In contrast to the traditional 
manner previously applied in the official analysis of the accident, the most 
fundamental benefits of the application of the adapted HFACS model are 
comprehensive explanations in response to what caused the unsafe acts. The 
difference to other views is that the focus is not on the unsafe acts alone, but on a 
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variety of factors from the precondition of unsafe acts to the social environment 
influence, far away from the sharp end. This positively guides the investigators to 
look beyond the actions taken by the frontline operators and into the latent conditions 
that provide the opportunity of expression of those actions. Those latent conditions at 
the blunt end, in particular the organizational factors, albeit far from the sharp end, 
once identified are relevant to prevent the accident occurrence and protect the system 
in the form of setting up functional barriers at those levels. As a consequence, it has 
been noted that the new insight is conducive to generate lessons learned from the 
accidents and strategies for safety management. 
By analyzing the two instances in the adapted HFACS model, an increasing quantity 
of remote factors other than proximal factors were presented and analyzed in Chapter 
3, in spite of the fact that these factors are not direct causes in nature. In the first case, 
eight sorts of organizational factors out of nineteen contributory factors were 
presented in comparison to one out of six contributory factors by the traditional 
manner, while in the second instance, five sorts of organizational factors out of 
fourteen in total were illustrated in contrast to nil out of five in the traditional picture, 
with a systemic approach to view and understand accidents. A number of 
contributory factors explored from its ground make people understand more deeply 
on what, how and why accidents happened in a more systemic, distinct and detailed 
way. More remote contributory factors, including organizational factors, are unveiled 
and analyzed according to the model structure, specifically conducive to research 
into human error, based on the extent of how the latent factors affect the actions or 
decision-makings of the frontline operators. 
In fact, Hollnagel (2004) pointed out that the process of analysis and explanation of 
the accident causation could be appreciated as to an approach to understand how one 
or more supposed barriers fail in protection of the system or mitigation of 
consequence severity. In this respect, the emerging numbers of underlying cause 
factors means more choices of functional barriers could be set up so as to protect the 
system next time if those companies in the instances are aware of the importance of 
the safety barriers highlighted by the model, similar accidents will perhaps occur 
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again in the present settings otherwise. In other words, by using this model, the 
investment to implement the ISM Code will maximise its financial benefits and cost 
savings in the form of a reduced possibility that an accident will take place again. 
More importantly, from the safety management point of view, these safety barriers 
could be regarded as the safety functions more than barriers themselves, which 
constitute the “safety web” (Harms-Ringdahl, 2009, p.362) in the system it protects. 
By analysing the safety function in the organization, people are capable of evaluating 
how far the safety functions still effectively work. 
On the other hand, those failures at the remote end often persist for a long while, but 
not being detected until their expressions in the form of accidents come true, perhaps 
triggered by the unfortunate frontline operators. They have an incubation period prior 
to the outbreak, in comparison to the virus in the animal body posing potential 
dangers. In this respect, an accident is not a totally bad issue to an organization, but 
generating an opportunity of detecting the remote and potential deficiencies which 
may not be detected and identified in the routine course of risk assessment. However, 
this opportunity carries with the possibility of property or even life loss. Examples 
can be easily found in the above instances in Chapter 3. A typical example is the 
failure of correcting the absence of the rubber packings around the edge of the bow 
visor although it was denied as the decisive factor of the causal story. As one of the 
contributory factors, it could have been corrected if the organizational climates, e.g. 
if the priority of safety margin despite time pressure, had worked effectively prior to 
departure. It is true that in the company instead of safety awareness, the awareness of 
voyage time pressure was emphatic and often recognized at all operational levels 
prior to that accident. The correction of the absence of the rubber packings proved 
conclusively to be impossible when the solutions to prevent this occurring seemed to 
be out of the captain’s reach due to this reason. The pressing concern on barriers to 
be set up at the management levels was dysfunctional in terms of the repeatedly 
noted time pressure on voyage, with the speculation that the disaster may not take 
place by such a deficiency. Moreover, given the risk assessment perspective, the 
identification of a potential threat at the first stage had been already noted and 
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reported prior to the evolution of the defects in the accident, but failed to evaluate its 
severity and stop its further evolution, still in an alive state. Due to the safety climate, 
the management level discounted the “ambiguous threat” (Edmondson, Roberto, 
Bohmer, Ferlins & Feldman, 2005) rather than making an explicit decision to assume 
the presence of such a real threat, and then eradicate the potential threat in its cradle. 
The level of management where safety was not deeply engaged in accordance with 
the adapted HFACS model application and analysis should be required to be 
reviewed overall at intervals in order to build proper barriers at those levels within 
the system accordingly. 
In brief, it is suggested that more preventive measures in both quantity and quality at 
all levels of an organization will be produced when employing this new form of 
analysis. In addition, a better understanding over the pathology of an accident, 
particularly factors at organizational level, is significant for ensuring the future 
preventive work be successful. These results with organizational barriers can be used 
in both safety improvements and learning accordingly.  
5.2 The significant role of the organizational factors in the maritime 
context 
As discussed in the first part, the agreement we have reached is that the new insight, 
provided by the adapted HFACS model, authorizes us to have a free hand to 
diagnose how the accident took place with a deeper and more comprehensive view, 
and explores more fundamental contributory factors - in particular organizational 
factors, although these factors were seldom revealed by formal investigations 
(Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009). This section establishes an overview of how 
these factors influence a ship’s safety, namely by recognizing the contribution of 
organizational factors associated with the ISM Code to a ship’s safety, by discussing 
the final outcomes observed in Chapter 3.  
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In fact, a considerable amount of recent research (including Schröder, Baldauf & 
Ghirxi, 2009) revealed some reasons why investigators were reluctant to trace the 
origin of an accident back to the organizational level. A scarcity of familiarization 
with a proper causation model in coping with non-linear development events 
becomes one of the identified reasons. Additionally, in the absence of a 
comprehensive approach over the analysis of accidents, it is hard to assess the role of 
organizational factors in safety performance in the maritime context. Fortunately, 
thanks to the creation of the adapted HFACS framework, a comprehensive review on 
the contribution of the organizational factors, directive to the effectiveness of the 
ISM Code in the organization, can be conducted. From the adapted HFACS 
framework point of view, within the spectrum of the model, the relations among each 
factor are mostly interdependent. Among them are diverse degree and direction 
interactions, an indication of the “safety control flow” (Swedish Rescue Service 
Agency, 2000, p57) from a closed loop control perspective, including those factors at 
the low and high levels. As to the original Reason’s model, aside from the sequent 
influential flow between higher and lower levels and its influence from top to bottom, 
Reason (1997, see Figure 3) himself did not specify any clear clues of interactions at 
the same level. 
  
Figure 3 Reason’s Model. 
Source: Reason (1997). 
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Actually, the experience to apply such a framework suggests the interactions be far 
more complicated than those described by Reason. The epidemiological property of 
the Reason’s model argued by Hollnagel (2004), discussed in Chapter 4, also 
supports such evidence of the sophisticated interactions inside Reason’s model. So is 
the adapted HFACS framework by its origin. In the adapted HFACS framework, the 
failures of organizational factors’ interactions often end up with the unsafe acts 
(except some cases where there is no unsafe act involved, such as the first case), 
subsequently inducing the accident. In this respect, human error was no longer 
regarded as being the symptom of trouble inside the system. If so, the blame should 
be placed on the account of the system as well. If not, it is the failure of the system 
that creates human error, such as the failure of interaction. To simplify, the 
interactions that affect the organizational manner in terms of maritime safety are 
generally categorized as two groups: internal interactions and external interactions. 
(1) Within the categories of the organizational influences, the sub-factors at the level 
of 2nd Tier or even the 3rd Tier directly or indirectly interact with each other 
concerning maritime safety. Whether the induced effects are positive or negative 
depends on the extent to how one factor is compatible with another. For instance, 
organizational climate, which is defined as the collective perception of organization 
safety practice at the individual level, affects greatly the process of decision-making 
of allocation of resource. In the second case, the lack of an ideal safety climate 
within the shipping company led to the inadequacy of implementing the safety 
regulation on equipping it with updated charts on board, as well as the proper 
procedure of crew employment. In some cases, job designs with critical functions 
will be allocated to several positions at the same level, and are based on these 
principles so that diverse and independent interactions serve to monitor or verify the 
safety performance in a particular function. These factors are in parallel in the system, 
often overlapping with diverse interactions. If these interactions are proved to be 
incompatible and dysfunctional, it will be a risk ending up with a negative 
consequence, with an increasing possibility of an unsafe act at the sharp end 
accordingly.  
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(2) When it comes to the interactions between organizational factors with other 
levels of contributory factors, it becomes far more complicated than the internal 
interactions as discussed above. From the top to bottom, the interaction is naturally 
transmitted through the levels one by one from the latent failure to the active failure. 
However, sometimes, the interaction could be directly transmitted to the unsafe act at 
the sharp end rather than through the supervision or workplace level. In spite of the 
fact that, e.g. in the first case, when there was no unsafe act, the accident still takes 
place, the combination or accumulation of organizational factors directly or 
indirectly contributes to the onset of accidents. In other words, the organizational 
factors are able to induce the accident in the situation even without initial event 
triggering by the unsafe acts. On the other hand, no organization is living outside the 
social environments. In determining the contributory factors, those factors at the 
environmental level should be taken into account in this regard. This provides us 
with an opportunity to review the effectiveness of the legislative systems in the event 
of it lagging behind the technological innovation or malfunctioning presently. Yet 
the organizational factors still play a decisive role in determining the level of system 
safety performance because of their proactive requirements and social responsibility 
to the public. In consideration of the new amended requirement of risk assessment in 
the ISM Code, the organization is obligatory to be proactive to protect their system 
or specifically its ships, no matter there is a proper legislative requirement or 
standard or not. In return for the wealth gained socially, the organization shall be in 
collaboration to well create a safe society. The unique feature of the ISM Code fully 
reflects that the legislative system exhibits a tendency of setting more functional 
requirements than descriptive requirements. Another example is Chapter Ⅱ-2 of the 
SOLAS Convention concerning fire safety on board.  
By judging the model itself, the accident itself, whether triggered unsafe acts or not, 
often begins with the negative organizational influence – from the top position in the 
model. On the other hand, by its diverse interactions with the dynamic environment 
and preventive influences on the human variability, the organization in the 
framework functions as a buffer between the human variability and system and 
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between the social environment and system, as something that offsets the excessive 
variability when there is too much of it or compensates the variability when there is a 
scarcity of it (Hollnagel, 2009, p.57). The failures in terms of being functioned as a 
buffer at the organizational level become clear, with its negative effect transferring 
down through various organizational and departmental pathways to, no matter via 
supervision or the workplace or not, where there is no offsetting or compensation of 
variability to cope with human variability and its dynamic environment (which is 
discussed in the next part). A huge number of such unsafe acts often take place, 
however, whereas only a very few of unsafe acts can really trigger the accident 
unless they penetrate into the last barrier in the “Swiss Cheese”. Considering the fact 
that, on the other hand, the established barriers, which should have been effective, 
are impaired by the organizational factors. 
In addition, Reason (1997) argues “the higher an individual’s position within the 
organization is, the harder it is to proceduralize the job operation”, it will end up with 
a wider and more tragic consequence if such an individual fails to achieve his/her 
role. In this respect, human variability at the higher management level with fewer 
standard barriers or restrictions often brings about more risks to the whole system 
than that at the sharp end. On the other hand, will it become debatable to define 
whether decision-making at that level is right or not, until the tragic consequences 
become visible? The need to analyze organizational factors thereby becomes 
straightforwardly urgent in hope that the system with effective barriers at all levels 
can be established.  
The main contribution of this model helps people to understand and appreciate that 
the frontline operators-the seafarers-will possibly be remitted from the instigators of 
an accident, subsequently to be as the inheritors, as asserted by Reason (2008). Those 
people who should have been protected by the organizational barriers are expected to 
be regarded as the victims of failures of organizational factors, but not perpetrators 
from the traditional perspective. The meaning of this model, if being applied in 
maritime accident investigations practice, will lie in directing the accident analysis 
into a deeper and more symbolic level at which the factors contribute more 
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substantially than the frontline operator to the accident (Mohaghegh, Kazemi & 
Mosleh, 2009). What is more significant is that it may give birth to an innovative 
reform to shift the emphasis of investigation from the sharp end to the remote end by 
a function of multiple organizational factors in practice. But we are more willing to 
see a phenomenon that the organizational managers will be motivated to take more 
effective measures to create an ideal workplace where unsafe acts can be least likely 
to be committed, in avoidance of being blamed for their absent role. 
In short, diversified organizational factors involved in the system directly or 
indirectly affect the possibility of occurrence of unsafe acts, eventually leading to 
disasters. Therefore, proper consideration should be taken into account at the 
organizational level for effectively preventing the similar accident recurrence. The 
significant exploration of organizational factors in such a way helps us not only to 
better understand how the accident occurred, but also learn more lessons from the 
accidents on how to prevent their occurrence. 
5.3 The dynamic and uncertain system in nature 
Thousands of years ago, the ancient Chinese philosophical text the I Ching (or Book 
of Changes) described a philosophical proverb that in brief in Chinese is “Shangbian, 
Guizhong, and Qushi”, meaning that the world where we live in always remains in a 
state of varying; in order to survive, we therefore need to be in well-preparedness and 
respond correspondingly to the proper extent in a justified manner at a appropriate 
time. In essence, “Shangbian” rightly unveils one of important properties of the 
system safety - dynamics and uncertainty. This is not only due to “the human 
variability in the form of timely adjustments, tweakings and adaptations” (Reason, 
2008), but also the dynamic and unpredictable environment surrounding the system.  
The human variability in the safety system could be evidenced by the unbelievably 
malfunctioned action of exchanging a crew in the second instance. The system with 
regard to the safe navigation had transiently been maintained at a comparably stable 
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level before the new master boarded the vessel, despite some deficiencies or 
turbulences residing. Since the former master was familiar with, and often called at 
this port by another route, even without updated information on the bridge 
construction available on board, the vessel was still able to leave and arrive safely 
and as stable as required. For the time, the significant role of updated information on 
the bridge construction in terms of past routes was not so prominent due to the fact 
that the master’s voyage passage did not come across the water area of constructed 
bridge, something like the role of the positive “performance variability” (Hollnagel, 
2009, p.96), i.e. “heroic recovery” (Reason, 2008) under the circumstance without 
proper charts. Since the arrival of the new master in question brought about a change 
of climate on board, such “stochastic resonance” (Hollnagel, 2004) by the human 
variability beyond the acceptable limit - the occurrence of the unexpected - the 
collision between the vessel and the bridge span. From the systemic point of view, 
the human variability regarded as the internal source of uncertainty leads to the 
instability of the system. Given that the vessel was manned with a group of qualified 
crew, using standard procedures and equipped with updated charts with proper small 
corrections, the “stochastic resonance” may be maintained at a certain acceptable 
level, without running over the threshold, even in the case of route changing.  
Another reason why the system is dynamic is seeing that the varied and 
unpredictable circumstances. In the second example described in Chapter 3, when the 
vessel’s voyage moved to the current line between Tallinn and Stockholm, the 
unexceptional wind and wave condition resulted in an over wave-induced impact 
load, the inadequacy of load on the bow visor appearing to be prominent enough to 
bring about the failure of the bow visor’s attachment. Such a given situation that the 
ESTONIA encountered was unpredictable and out of all human capability in spite of 
the weather report that was issued in advance. However, in accordance with the 
survey in the official report, the weather conditions in the open area of the Baltic Sea 
are apparently rougher than that along the previous line between Turku and 
Stockholm. Apparently, the outside environment surrounding the vessel’s operation 
varied after the vessel’s transferring. Notwithstanding, the following disaster proves 
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that insufficient countermeasures had been taken in response to the rougher and 
longer route condition. In contrast to the second case, there was no unsafe act 
triggering the ESTONIA disaster, in the sense that nothing relating to human 
wrongdoing apparently occurred. However, this does not matter with the occurrence 
of the accident. Instead, the concurrence of an amount of events at diverse levels 
within the organization, in particularly under a dynamic and uncertain environment, 
induced such a disaster.  
Living in such a kind of dynamic and uncertain world, the Book of Changes properly 
requires us to respond proactively in order to drag the system with potential risk back 
to the stable state at the appropriate time with a proper and sufficient approach. The 
requirement of the Book of Changes is what is to be discussed a little further here - 
organizational resilience, a kind of solution for the organization in response to the 
dynamic and uncertain system. The eminent safety engineering author Hollnagel 
(2006) defines it as “the essence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an 
organization (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows 
it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continue 
stress.” Such a definition is in line with the motto of the Book of Changes, with an 
illustration of the necessity of corresponding change and appropriateness of both the 
extent and opportunity of that change.  
In response to the system’s disturbance caused by human variability and interaction 
under uncertain surroundings, correspondingly changing a part of, or the entire 
system, is necessary to improve the reliability and quality of the system. From the 
perspective of Hollnagel (2009, pp.41-44), the human variability refers to the 
satisficing which is explained as a consequence of limited cognitive capacity, while 
the dynamic and uncertain environment relates to the sacrificing which is construed 
as a consequence of the intractability of the work environment. The key issues here 
in response to the satisficing and sacrificing are the extent to how much changes are 
needed, what the opportunity of change is, and what the changes should react, so that, 
for instance, the legislation can keep pace with the innovation of the techniques. In 
the first cases if the industry can work together with the companies or 
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administrations involved in response to the numbers of similar incidents properly and 
timely, the accident may not end up with such a dramatically tragic outcome. The 
degree of the organizational resilience relies on the capacity at each organizational 
level in dealing with the “flexible and informal way of working” (McDonald, 2006) 
system dynamics. Even in the context of the shuttle program in the USA where there 
are enough budgets, well-programmed procedures and well-educated personnel, for 
instance, the lack of informal communication channel flow of information was 
blamed as one of the organizational deficiencies in the case of the Columbia 
(Milliken, Lant & Bridwell-Mitcheel, 2005).  
On the other hand, the system itself, when in a safe situation, is not stable in nature at 
all - still in dynamic and uncertain property. Seeing that the human “heroic role” in 
adjustment of the deviation functions back to normative performance, the system 
appears to run peacefully and smoothly, in comparison with the calm sea surface that 
an amount of water in dynamic movement is moving inside it. In the second case, the 
former master acted as “heroic role” in maintaining the operation of the ship at a 
safety level despite the absence of chart small correction and bridge construction 
information.  
The dynamic and uncertain property of the system makes the importance of the 
organizational resilience symbolic in striving to offset the negative effect through 
human variability and a dynamic environment. Therefore, being ready to encounter 
the unexpected at any time as a “high reliable organization” (Weick & Sutchliffe, 
2007) is an obligatory way to pave the road to safety heaven. The legal style of 
elements in the ISM Code to be functional rather than descriptive, rightly addresses 
such a need for the organizational factors - dynamics. 
To sum up, the role of the organizational factors appears to be indispensable in 
ensuring the safety performance in the maritime context. In this regard, more 
functional barriers for the purpose of minimizing the possibility of 
unsafe-acts-induced accidents and the consequences are recommended to be set up at 
each level of organization under the direction of the fundamental lessons and 
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strategies learned from the maritime accident investigations. Furthermore, the 
dynamic property of a system requires organizational resilience in terms of safety 
performance, to be ready to respond with the appropriate action in an acceptable 
manner at the proper opportunity. 
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 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
As noted previously, in comparison to only blaming the frontline operators, it is more 
symbolic for us to learn lessons from the accident investigation on how to prevent 
similar accidents recurrence. For this purpose, this paper is motivated to seek a 
proper accident causation model to identify the roles of the organizational factors in 
maritime casualties. A substantial amount of effort was made to adapt the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework with proper 
consideration of the specific situation in the maritime industry and elements of the 
ISM Code, which predominantly deals with organizational control in safety 
performance on board. Then along with two case studies using such a model, the 
applicability was verified positively and the roles of the organizational factors in 
maritime context are highlighted and discussed. Some observations regarding the 
framework applications into maritime cases and recommendations concerning how to 
use the framework in the future are made below: 
6.1 Conclusions 
For the adapted model: 
1. The adapted HFACS framework proved to be effective in maritime accident 
investigation. By successfully analyzing two case studies, it was observed that it 
is positive to collect comprehensive data with the help of the adapted HFACS 
framework and provide deep and reliable analysis of the accident. Its special 
contribution to the maritime accident investigation is to guide investigators how 
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to collect data and proceduralize investigations and the analysis of an accident 
with the focus on human and organizational factors. 
2. Aside from specialized investigatory authorities, same principles of the adapted 
HFACS framework can be applied as well by the shipping industry for the 
purpose of reviewing and benchmarking safety performance both on board and 
for shore management. In addition to look into maritime accidents 
retrospectively for the purpose of diagnose what is wrong inside the 
organization, successful experience can also be concluded and exampled by the 
means of the adapted HFACS framework from the majority of successful cases 
which are more valuable and pervasive than failures to learn. 
3. Due to its full integration of the elements of the ISM Code, the adapted HFACS 
framework can be specifically utilized as a manual of measuring the safety 
performance of the ISM Code on board and for shore-based management. By 
providing the whole-view picture on how the elements the ISM Code interact 
with safety performance, safety managers are aware of the importance of 
implementing the ISM Code with higher possibility. In this regard, the 
implementing organizational decision can be well managed by clearly 
evaluating possible interactions with those factors in the adapted HFACS 
framework. 
For the organizational factors in maritime casualties: 
1. By the means of such an adapted HFACS, it will be positive to learn lessons 
from maritime accidents with a focus on the organizational levels. This is 
important because of their significant influence on maintaining maritime safety. 
2. Organizational factors by their interactions with those factors mostly at the 
lower level, such as the sharp end, are substantially influential on safety 
performance on board, even in the situation where there is no unsafe act 
involved. The magnification of the influence by the organizational factors is 
possible to be made on the sharp end. 
 79
3. Organizational resilience is required to be maintained in response to the human 
variability and environmental dynamics in order to sustain stable safety 
performance on board. The adapted HFACS framework is, however, not fully 
capable of focusing on resilience aspects. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Based on the considerations above, the following recommendations should be given: 
1. Time and resources are suggested to be intensively invested in investigation and 
analysis. According to the categories in the framework discussed previously, a 
thorough review of the organizational performance requires relevant 
information at all levels of organization. In this respect, thoroughness should 
not be compromised with efficiency to quickly and off-handily finalize accident 
investigations without producing high-value and workable results, cf. ETTO 
(Hollnagel, 2009), at least in major accidents.  In accordance with the ISM 
Code, however, contemporary shipowners are allowed to set aside the 
responsibility of management to the shipping companies. This may bring about 
difficulties to the flag state administration concerning the geographical 
separation of the shipping companies diverse from the flag state. At least, a 
complete review of a major accident requires a considerable amount of time and 
resources. 
2. A major consideration should be made to develop and document proper 
procedures or guidance on how to apply the adapted HFACS framework. Each 
framework has its limitations. As Svenson (as cited in Katsakiori, 
Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009) noted “an accident can be explained in 
different ways depending on the accident analysis model that is used” due to its 
diverse theoretical hypotheses on which the model is based. The WYLFIWYE 
principle stated by Hollnagel also implicated that the conclusions of accident 
investigations may be guided explicitly or implicitly by the assumptions or 
methods that are used in investigations. It is not surprising that a number of 
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investigations with differing premises or instructions may lead to diverse 
conclusions in practical maritime accident investigations. This means a certain 
accident causation model, such as the adapted HFACS framework, has always 
limitations, and therefore accident investigators have to be aware of this.   
3. Sufficient training of familiarization of the adapted HFACS framework should 
be given to investigators. The quality of utilizing such a framework greatly 
would be contingent on the degree of the investigators’ comprehension of the 
framework. A typical example is the external environmental factors in the 
framework. In some cases, the meteorological conditions have a decisive effect 
in determining safety performance on board. These cases should not be 
off-handly attributed failures to the organizational factors if such organizations 
have completed all reasonable measures to prevent those accidents. 
Last but not least, the extent of effectiveness of applying the adapted model into 
specific accidents relies on the recognized degree of the investigatory agency 
concerning the comprehension of human error and profile of the investigatory agency. 
The acceptance of the adapted HFACS framework might not positively change the 
way in which the maritime industry, commerce and regulatory authorities view the 
causation of the accident derived from such a framework unless they properly apply 
it. If such a framework is widely applied in the maritime industry, corresponding 
accident databases will be in a well-organized and unique format so statistical and 
analytical job from these databases by administrations to conclude certain safety 
tendencies, or shipping companies to generate certain safety patterns, will make more 
practical sense.  
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